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OHIO'S ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION: A DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
by
MAX KRAVITZ*
This Article examines whether Ohio's imposition of an administrative
license suspension "ALS" immediately upon arrest for operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of alcohol "OMVI" bars a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the substantive offense.' Traditionally, administrative license
suspensions have been considered civil, administrative and primarily re-
medial. However, increasingly punitive amendments to Ohio's ALS statu-
tory scheme raise the substantial question of whether an ALS is truly re-
medial, or whether the imposition of an ALS constitutes punishment trig-
gering double jeopardy and due process protection .
2
Recent decisions from the Second and Tenth Appellate Districts3 have
struck down provisions in Ohio's OMVI/ALS legislation which prohibited
a trial court from issuing a stay of an ALS at a motorist's initial appear-
ance in court as violative of the separation of powers doctrine. This article
examines whether a court's ability to grant an immediate stay of the ALS
sufficiently insulates the ALS/OMVI scheme from constitutional attack. It
is the author's conclusion that Ohio's present OMVI/ALS statutory scheme
* Max Kravitz, Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. J.D., 1973, Capital
University Law School. Member, Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission.
1. This article examines whether the imposition of an ALS violates double jeopardy and
due process protection in the context of a first-time arrestee. Penalties in Ohio become
increasingly severe based on the past record of convictions for OMVI, or refusals to take
requested chemical tests. These enhanced penalties can include both impoundment and
forfeiture of vehicles.
The provisions of the OMVI/ALS, as they relate to multiple offenders, certainly should be
scrutinized. In fact, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division, recently struck down seizure and impoundment provisions of Title 45 of the Revised
Code as violative of due process, insofar as they relate to innocent owners of vehicles. See
Kutschbach v. Davies, 885 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
As a general matter, the author agrees that arrestees with a prior record for OMVI offenses
present a greater future risk to public safety than first-time arrestees. See State v. Elfrink, No.
95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995). Although
many aspects of this article are as relevant to motorists with prior records as to first-time
arrestees, it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze how Ohio's current OMVI/ALS
provisions affect repeat offenders.
2. State v. Hlavin, No. 95-G-1912, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App., 11th Dist., Jan. 19, 1996); State
v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Aug. 18, 1995); State
v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June 27), appeal
granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995).
3. State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist.,
Sept. 29, 1995); Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APCOI-83, 1995 WL 527769 (Ohio
Ct. App., 10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995).
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violates a motorist's due process and double jeopardy rights. However,
if the Ohio Supreme Court adopts the rationale of the Second and Tenth
Appellate Districts and permits trial courts to make discretionary judg-
ments about the imposition of the ALS shortly after a motorist's arrest,
based on the characteristics of both the offense and the individual, Ohio's
OMVI/ALS provisions should be held constitutional.
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OHIO'S ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 5, 1993, Ohio enacted a new drunk driving law that provided
enhanced penalties for the offense ("OMVI"), 4 as well as an immediate admin-
istrative suspension of a driver's license ("ALS"). This suspension is to be ef-
fected by the arresting officer at the time of arrest, upon either of the follow-
ing conditions: a refusal to take a requested blood, breath or urine test ("re-
fusal"), or, upon taking a requested test, having the test result exceed the
prohibited concentration of alcohol permitted by statute ("failure"). 5 Similar
ALS\OMVI provisions have been adopted by sister states, 6 in part because
states receive federal funding for adopting and implementing programs to
reduce traffic safety problems resulting from persons driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or controlled substances.7
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Baldwin 1994) provides:
(A) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state,
if any of the following apply:
(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug
of abuse;
(2) The person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one percent or more by weight
of alcohol in his blood;
(3) The person has a concentration often-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of
alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath;
(4) The person has a concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram or more by
weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his urine.
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Baldwin 1994) provides, in part:
(A) Any person who operates a vehicle upon a highway or any public or private property
... shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of his blood,
breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, drug, or alcohol and drug
content of his blood, breath, or urine ....
(D)(I) If a person under arrest . . .either . . .refuses to submit to the designated
chemical test or the person submits to the designated chemical test and the test results
indicate that his blood contained a concentration of ten-hundredths of one per cent or
more by weight of alcohol, his breath contained a concentration of ten-hundredths of
one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath, or his
urine contained a concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight
of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his urine at the time of the alleged offense, the
arresting officer shall do all of the following:
(a) on behalf of the registrar, serve a notice of suspension on the person that advises
the person that .... his driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident
operating privilege is suspended, [and] that the suspension takes place immediately,
. . . ; seize the Ohio or out-of-state driver's license or permit of the person; and
immediately forward the seized license or permit to the registrar.
6. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 625 § 5/11-501.1(a) (West Supp. 1995); IND. CODE §§ 9-
30-6-1 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 257.625c (West Supp. 1994); PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1547(a) (West Supp. 1995).
7.23 U.S.C. § 408 (e)(l)(A) (1994) states in pertinent part:
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The enactment of the ALS in sister states was immediately challenged
on a variety of constitutional grounds; however, most challenges were re-
jected.8 Despite the earlier opinions to the contrary, recent decisions from the
United States Supreme Court expanding the concept of punishment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause and the Eighth Amendment 9 have provided new
impetus and legitimacy to various constitutional attacks. 0
For purposes of this section, a State is eligible for a basic grant [providing funds to
implement programs to reduce traffic safety problems resulting from persons driving
while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance] if such State provides -
(A) for the prompt suspension, for a period of not less than ninety days in the case of a
first offender and not less than one year in the case of a repeat offender, of the driver's
license of any individual who a law enforcement officer has probable cause under State
law to believe has committed an alcohol-related offense, and (i) to whom is administered
one or more chemical tests to determine whether the individual was intoxicated while
operating the motor vehicle and who is determined, as a result of such tests, to be
intoxicated, or (ii) who refuses to submit to such a test as proposed by the officer.
See also 23 C.F.R. § 1313.5 (1995), which requires states to implement an "expedited driver's
license suspension or revocation system" in order to become eligible for "a basic incentive
grant of 30 percent of the State's [highway maintenance] apportionment for FY 1992." See
State v. Tanner, 472 N.E.2d 689, 690 n.1 (Ohio 1984); Kirsten Davis, Note, Ohio's
Administrative License Suspension for Drunk Driving: Essential Statute Has Unconstitutional
Effect, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 697, 697 n.l (1994) (citing Michael A. Medeiros, Comment, Hawaii's
New Administrative Driver's License Revocation Law: A Preliminary Due Process Inquiry,
14 HAWAII L. REV. 853, 855 n.10 (1991)).
8. E.g. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (double jeopardy); State v.
Nichols, 819 P.2d 995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v. Schwander, Nos. IN94-08-1350 to IN94-08-1354, 1995 WL
413248 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) (same); Davidson v. Mackinnon, 656 So.2d 223 (Fla. Ct. App.
1995) (same); Freeman v. State, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla. Ct.App. 1992), appeal denied 623
So.2d 493 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Lindemann v. Florida, 114 S. Ct. 415 (1993)
(same); State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995) (double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel); State v. Talavera, 905 P.2d 633 (Idaho 1995) (double jeopardy); State v. Maze,
825 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992) (same); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 609
So.2d 790 (La. 1992) (due process and double jeopardy); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265
(Me. 1995) (double jeopardy); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
(same); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App.), appeal granted, 1995 Minn.
Lexis 695 (Minn. Aug. 9, 1995) (due process and double jeopardy); State v. Young, 530
N.W.2d 269 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (double jeopardy); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Ver.
1992) (same).
9. See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994);
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
10. See State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025,1995 WL 243352 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Apr. 20,
1995) (violative of double jeopardy); State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995)
(ALS violates separation of powers); State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ohio Mun.
Ct. 1995) (holding that subsequent prosecution for the OMVI charge after the ALS violates
double jeopardy provisions); State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371
(Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist., Sept. 29, 1995) (ALS violates separation of powers); Village of
Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APCO1-83, 1995 WL 527769 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist., Sept.
5, 1995) (ALS violates separation of powers); State v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL
490937 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Aug. 18, 1995) (ALS violative of due process); State v.
[Vol. 29:2
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In Ohio, defendants immediately challenged the imposition of the ALS
on both double jeopardy and due process grounds. Two of these challenges
have been successful in the appellate courts, and the Ohio Supreme Court has
agreed to review both decisions during the upcoming term. In State v.
Gustafson, the Seventh Appellate District barred, on double jeopardy
grounds, the prosecution of the defendant on both the "under the influence"
and "per se" sections of R.C. § 4511.19, because of the imposition of an ALS
at the time of arrest." In State v. Knisely, the Sixth Appellate District, while
upholding the conviction of Knisely for OMVI, held that the ALS, imposed
"on-the-spot" at the time of arrest, is violative of due process as guaranteed
by the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
12
Recently the Tenth Appellate District decided the case of Village of
Groveport v. Lovsey. 3 In Lovsey, the court held that the section of Ohio's
implied consent law prohibiting courts from issuing a stay of the ALS pend-
ing the outcome of OMVI charges violates the separation of powers doctrine
of the Ohio Constitution. 4 The prohibition was held to impede the court's
Gustafson, No. 94 CA 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June 27), appeal
granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995); City of Berea v. Ellwell, No. 95 TRC 10222-01, slip
op. (Ohio Mun. Ct. June 6, 1995) (ALS violates double jeopardy); State v. Postlethwait, No.
95 TRC-1369, slip op. (Ohio Mun. Ct. April 10, 1995) (ALS violates double jeopardy).
Lawyers Weekly USA has catalogued successful double jeopardy challenges to OMVI
offenses in 25 states. LAW. WKLY USA, October 9, 1995. In addition, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has dismissed two cases against defendants
who had been arrested for OMVI on a military base. See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 896 F.
Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1995) (Although declining to issue an injunction to stay state criminal
proceedings, the district court stated that the double jeopardy defense is "colorable, if not
compelling.").
11. No. 94 CA 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June 27), appeal granted,
652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995). See also State v. Hlavin, No. 95-G-1912, slip op. (Ohio Ct.
App., 1 th Dist., Jan. 19, 1996) (also invalidating a subsequent presecution for OMVI on
double jeopardy grounds).
12. No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Aug. 18), appeal granted,
655 N.E.2d 136 (Ohio 1995). Id. at *4. The court declined to review Knisely's double
jeopardy claim because it was not raised in the trial court. However, the court implied that it
was sympathetic to the double jeopardy issue by referring to the Gustafson case for
consideration of double jeopardy claims. Id. at *2 n. 1.
The Ohio Supreme Court has also agreed to review State v. Hochhausler, Nos. CA93-12-
104, CA93-12-105, 1995 WL 308484 (Ohio Ct. App., 12 Dist., May 22, 1995), which held, in
a 2-1 decision, that the imposition of the ALS does not violate due process.
13. No. 95 APCO1-83, 1995 WL 527769 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995). Neither
party pursued an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
14. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Baldwin 1994) provides, in pertinent part:
If the person appeals the suspension at his initial appearance, the appeal does not stay
the operation of the suspension . . .[N]o court has jurisdiction to grant a stay of a
suspension imposed under ... this section, and any order issued by any court that
purports to grant a stay of any suspension imposed under either of those divisions shall
not be given administrative effect. ...
Winter 1996]
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inherent ability to hear and properly determine actions and proceedings within
the court's jurisdiction. As will be shown, the ability of a court to stay the
ALS at the outset of an OMVI prosecution may have an impact on the court's
ultimate determination as to whether the ALS violates due process, as well as
whether the ALS constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes."5
See also State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d
Dist., Sept. 29, 1995); State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995). In Baker, the
Springfield Municipal Court, While upholding most provisions of Am. Sub. H.B. 432 as
constitutional, agreed with the defendants that certain aspects of the legislation concerning
the ALS were unconstitutional and unenforceable. These provisions were: (a) the lack of
discretion afforded the courts in granting hardship occupational driving privileges pending
the appeal of the ALS; (b) the divestiture of the court's inherent power to stay the ALS
pending its appeal; and (c) the lack of termination of the ALS of a driver taking the test who
is later convicted of OMVI upon a plea. Id. at 1384.
15. Article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ohio courts have interpreted this provision in the same
manner as the federal courts have interpreted its federal counterpart. OHIO CONST. art. I, §
10. See City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646 N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995) (Ohio
double jeopardy provision is "substantially equivalent" to its federal counterpart).
No case has been found where Ohio has provided greater protection under its state
constitutional double jeopardy provision than under the federal provision. Moreover, it can
be inferred that the Ohio provision provides less protection than its federal counterpart since
Ohio does not permit an interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy issues in a criminal case.
See Wenzel v. Enright, 623 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Ohio 1993) (holding the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on double jeopardy is not subject to an interlocutory appeal); State v. Crago,
559 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 941 (1991). See also Borsick v.
State, 652 N.E.2d 951, 952 (Ohio 1995) (interlocutory habeas corpus relief improper for
denial of motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy).
In Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was immediately
appealable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). Most states have interpreted this opinion as
holding that the federal Constitution mandates some type of interlocutory review for the
denial of double jeopardy claims. See, e.g, State v. Choate, 725 P.2d 764, 764 (Ariz. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. Nalbandian v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 498 U.S. 997 (1990); County Ct. v.
Ruth, 575 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1977); Crawley v. Kunzman, 585 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Ky. 1989);
State v. Davis, 580 A.2d 163, 164 n.1 (Me. 1990); Gray v. State, 375 A.2d 31, 32 (Md. Ct.
App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Chatfield-Taylor, 502 N.E.2d 512, 513 (Mass. 1987); Griffin
v. State, 545 So.2d 729, 732 (Miss. 1989); State v. Milenkovich, 458 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Neb.
1990); Wenzel v. Enright, 623 N.E.2d 69, 73-74 (Ohio 1993) (Wright, J. dissenting); State ex
rel. Wark v. Freerksen, 733 P.2d 100, 102 (Or. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 738 P.2d 977 (Or.
1987) (review through writ of mandamus); Commonwealth v. Hall, 538 A.2d 43, 44 n.1 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 549 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1988); State v. Sanchez, 532 A.2d 956, 957
(R.I. 1987); Ex Parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1982) (review
through habeas corpus).
Some states have held, however, that Abney merely interpreted § 1291, the federal definition
of what constitutes a "final judgment," and that the federal Constitution does not require an
interlocutory review mechanism for double jeopardy claims. See, e.g., Burleson v. State,
552 So.2d 186, 186 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 387 N.E.2d
325, 330 (11.), cert. denied sub nom. Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940 (1979); State v. Joseph,
374 S.E.2d 132, 133 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), appeal denied sub nom. 377 S.E.2d 241 (N.C.
1989); State v. Mestas, 605 P.2d 1164, 1166 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Miller, 346
S.E.2d 705, 706 (S.C. 1986); State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114, 116 n.5 (Wis. 1980), overruled
[Vol. 29:2
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II. OHIO'S OMVI/ALS STATUTORY SCHEME
A. The OMVI Offense
Prior to 1983, Ohio had one generic OMVI offense which provided that
no person shall drive "under the influence of alcohol."' 6 The offense could be
proved by the actual inability to operate a motor vehicle, the demeanor and
admissions of the driver after arrest, the refusal to take a sobriety test, and by
offering the results of a blood, breath or urine test ("chemical test") to show
impairment. 7 A breath, blood or urine test above the statutory level would
trigger a presumption that an individual was "under the influence."' 8 The
in part by State v. Copening, 303 N.W.2d 821 (Wis. 1981). These states do not provide
interlocutory review of a denial of double jeopardy claims.
The reluctance of states to hear interlocutory appeals of double jeopardy claims has resulted
in federal courts, including the Sixth Circuit, holding that double jeopardy claims are an
exception to the abstention doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
See Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 964
(1993); Satter v. Leapley, 977 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1992); Davis v. Herring, 800 F.2d
513, 516 (5th Cir. 1986); Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1979); Drayton
v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 120 n.7 (2d. Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. McQueen v. Hayes, 603 F.2d
213 (2d Cir. 1979). The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently endorsed the view that a
"colorable double jeopardy claim is a preeminent example of one of the very few 'unusual
circumstances' justifying federal court intervention in state proceedings." Gilliam v. Foster,
61 F.3d 1070, 1082 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
16. See Am. Sub. S.B. No. 41, 130 Ohio Laws 1083 (amended 1968, 1970, 1971, 1975,
1983, 1987, 1990, 1994) (effective 7-11-63), which read in whole: "[n]o person who is under
the influence of alcohol shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this
state." Senate Bill 41 amended Section 4511.19 of the Code by substituting the word "alcohol"
for the prior phrase "intoxicating liquor." This law remained unchanged until 1968, when the
General Assembly added statutory presumptions of intoxication depending on the results of a
chemical test. See infra note 18.
The standard jury instruction defining "under the influence of alcohol" is derived from
State v. Hardy, 276 N.E.2d 247 (Ohio 1971), and reads:
UNDER THE INFLUENCE. "under the influence" means that the defendant consumed
some alcohol, whether mild or potent, in such a quantity, whether small or great, that it
adversely affected and appreciably impaired the defendant's actions, reaction, or mental
processes under the circumstances then existing and deprived him of that clearness of
the intellect and control of himself which he would otherwise have possessed. The
question is not how much alcohol would affect an ordinary person. The question is
what effect did any alcohol consumed by the defendant have on him at the time and
place involved. If the consumption of alcohol so affected the nervous system, brain,
or muscles of the defendant so as to impair, to an appreciable degree, his ability to
operate the vehicle, then the defendant was under the influence.
4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 545.25, 16 (Anderson 1995).
The term "appreciable" is defined as "noticeable or perceptible." It is not to be confused
with substantial. 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 545.25, 7. See MARK P. PAINTER & JAMES
M. LOOKER, OHIO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW § 1.15 (1995-96 ed.).
17. The term "chemical test" is used here to refer to any test approved by the Ohio
Department of Health to determine the amount of alcohol in a motorist's body. See OHIO
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3701-53-01 to 3701-53-03; Davis, supra note 7, at 700 n.19.
18. In 1968, the Ohio General Assembly amended Section 4511.19 of the Code to provide
Winter 1996]
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presumption was not conclusive; however, once it was established, the bur-
den was on the defendant to introduce evidence equal to or greater than the
prosecution's evidence before the finder of fact could disregard the presump-
tion. 9
In 1983, Ohio dramatically revised its drunk driving laws.21 Section
45 11.19 of the Ohio Revised Code was divided into four separate offenses.
2'
The prior "under the influence" provision was retained, but the statutory re-
buttable presumption was abolished.22 In its place, the legislature provided
that an individual is also guilty of OMVI merely by operating a motor vehicle
with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the person's blood, breath or
urine ("per se" offenses). 23 The critical "per se" issue at trial is the accuracy
that a test result of .15% of alcohol in the blood triggered a rebuttable presumption that an
individual was under the influence of alcohol. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 380, 132 Ohio Laws 1632-
32 (amended 1970, 1971, 1975, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994). In 1971, the threshold was reduced
to .10%. Am. Sub. S.B. No. 14, 134 Ohio Laws 39-40 (amended 1975, 1983, 1987, 1990,
1994). Test results which determined breath and urine alcohol had to be converted to blood
alcohol by use of a ratio.
The prior law also provided that a blood alcohol level ("BAC") lower than .05% gave rise
to a presumption of sobriety which could also be rebutted by sufficient evidence of intoxication.
For a discussion of Ohio's prior ALS and OMVI laws, see generally Dwight A. Packard, II,
Note, On a Collision Course: Procedural Due Process and Ohio's New Drunk Driving Laws,
20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1009 (1995), and Jon M. Rosemeyer, Note, S. 432: Ohio Enacts
Stringent Penalties To Deter Driving While Intoxicated, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 147 (1983).
19. State v. Myers, 271 N.E.2d 245, 252 (Ohio 1971); John F. Bender, Ohio's New Alcohol
Impaired Driving Law-A Judicial Perspective, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 117, 118 (1983).
20. Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 139 Ohio Laws 927, 945-47 (amended 1987, 1990, 1994).
21. Id. at 947. See supra note 2. The mandatory three day term of incarceration was
retained for first-time offenders; however, the General Assembly provided for a ten day
mandatory term of incarceration for second offenses within five years and a thirty day
mandatory term of incarceration for third offenses within five years. Packard, supra note 18,
at 1014.
22. See supra note 4; Newark v. Lucas, 532 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Ohio 1988). The statutory
presumption previously provided the prosecution with a nexus between the test result and
being "under the influence." Since the presumption has been eliminated, a test result is now
inadmissible in an "under the influence" case unless the prosecution presents expert testimony
correlating the test result to impairment. Id. at 134-35.
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(2)-(4).
The "per se" offenses define "the point the legislature has determined an individual cannot
drive without posing a substantial danger, not only to himself, but to others." Newark, 532
N.E.2d at 133 (citing State v. Tanner, 472 N.E.2d 689, 693 (Ohio 1984)). See Lewis R. Katz
& Robert D. Sweeney, Jr., Ohio's New Drunk Driving Law: A Halfhearted Experiment in
Deterrence, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1984). Katz and Sweeney discuss
epidemiological studies regarding the causal relationship between drinking and poor driving,
and declare that the relationship is supported by "conclusive scientific proof." Id. As an
individual's BAC approaches .08%, the likelihood of involvement in a crash increases
dramatically. A driver with a BAC of .15% is fifteen to twenty times more likely to be
involved in a fatal crash than a driver who has had nothing to drink. Id. At 240.
The effect of eliminating the rebuttable presumption in the statute is that a test result for
alcohol is admissible in the trial of a "per se" case as an essential element of the offense
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of the test, not the behavior of the accused.24 As to these "per se" offenses, the
ability to drive and typical demeanor evidence, such as the ability to perform
field sobriety tests, has been held irrelevant.
2
1
Theoretically, an individual can be convicted of four OMVI offenses
arising out of one incident, because an officer can demand that an individual
take more than one type of test to determine alcohol content.26 Therefore, the
statute provides that although a person may be charged with multiple offenses
of OMVI, the person "may not be convicted of more than one violation of
these divisions."
27
B. The Implied Consent Law
1. Pre- 1983
Although initially characterized as civil and administrative in nature,
28
the original version of the ALS was designed to encourage motorists to take
(provided compliance with Department of Health regulations). State v. Boyd, 479 N.E.2d
850, 851 (Ohio 1985) (proving the accused's BAC level-while operating the motor vehicle is
an essential element of a prosecution for a per se offense). Moreover, by making the "per se"
violations dependent on the amount of alcohol in a person's breath, or in a person's urine, the
legislature made it unnecessary for the prosecution to convert, by means of a ratio or otherwise,
breath or urine alcohol test results into a blood alcohol equivalent.
24. Katz & Sweeney, supra note 26, at 243. See also Donald G. Gifford & Howard M.
Friedman, A Constitutional Analysis of Ohio's New Drunk Driving Law, 15 U. TOL. L. REV.
133, 147-37 (1983).
25. In State v. Boyd, the Ohio Supreme Court held that demeanor evidence, such as a
person's appearance, manner of speech, walking, and lack of any symptoms of intoxication
are not relevant evidence in the trial of a "per se" offense. 479 N.E. at 851. Thus, under the
court's rationale, evidence that a person could drive through a slalom of cones faster and with
more dexterity than Emerson Fittipaldi or Bobby Rahal would not be admissible in a "per se"
case as circumstantial evidence that the test result was erroneous. The motorist would still be
guilty of OMVI if blood, breath or urine tests revealed a concentration of alcohol over the
"per se" level.
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 45 11.191(A) (Baldwin 1994) provides that "[a]ny person...
shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine
for the purpose of determining alcohol, drug or alcohol and drug content . . . ." (emphasis
added). See PAINTER & LOOKER, supra note 16, at 78, § 7.23. A refusal to submit to a
second test, such as a urine test after a breath test has been taken, has been held to constitute a
refusal. State v. Bakst, 506 N.E.2d 1208, 1212 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Stalego v. McCullion,
477 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
27. Section 45 11.19(C) of the Ohio Revised Code states that "[iln any proceeding arising
out of one incident, a person may be charged with a violation of division (A)(1) and a violation
of division (A)(I),(2), or (3) of this section, but he may not be convicted of more than one
violation of these divisions." OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4511.19(C) (Baldwin 1994). See
additionally § 2941.25 ("Multiple Counts") (providing that a person can be charged with two
or more offenses of similar import, but can only be convicted of one offense).
28. Andrews v. Turner, 368 N.E.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Ohio 1977); Hoban v. Rice, 267 N.E.2d
311, 315 (Ohio 1971); State v. Starnes, 254 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio 1970); State v. Hurbean, 261
N.E.2d 290, 296 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970).
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requested chemical tests upon arrest, and to penalize motorists who impeded
the collection of relevant evidence by their refusals. After an arrest for OMVI,
if a motorist refused to take a requested test, the officer would forward a sworn
report to the Registrar of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Registrar) stating that
there was probable cause to believe the motorist was operating a vehicle under
the influence of alcohol and that the motorist refused to submit to a requested
test.29 When the report was received by the Registrar, the Registrar would
notify the motorist3 ° of an impending six month driver's license suspension.3
If the motorist petitioned for a hearing to contest the suspension, the suspen-
sion would be stayed until the termination of any hearing or any appeal.32
Moreover, occupational driving privileges were available at the moment of
suspension.33 The actual imposition of the ALS could conceivably be delayed
for years if all appeals were exhausted.
2. 1983-1990
In 1983, the General Assembly enacted a comprehensive revision of
Ohio's OMVI/ALS statutes and tethered the ALS more directly to the substan-
tive offense.34 When a motorist refused a test or tested above the "per se"
limit, the court, at the initial appearance (which had to be held within five days
of arrest), issued a driver's rights suspension if one of five factors was found
to be present. 35 Any suspension of a license continued until a final adjudica-
29. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 380, 1967-68 Ohio Laws 1633 (1967) (amended 1969, 1972, 1975,
1977, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) (previous Revised Code §
4411.191(C)).
30. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 380, 1967-68 Ohio Laws 1634 (1967) (amended 1969, 1972, 1975,
1977, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) (previous Revised Code §
4411.191(E)).
31. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 380, 1967-68 Ohio Laws 1634 (1967) (amended 1969, 1972, 1975,
1977, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) (previous Revised Code §
4411.191(D)).
32. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 380, 1967-68 Ohio Laws 1636 (1967) (amended 1969, 1972, 1975,
1977, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) (previous Revised Code §
4411.191(D)); Andrews, 368 N.E.2d at 1254-55; Rosemeyer, supra note 18, at 157.
33. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 469, 1977-78 Ohio Laws 2763, 2766-67 (1978) (amended 1983,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) (previous Revised Code Section 4511.191(G)(5)).
34. Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 1981-82 Ohio Laws 927, 945-47 (1982) (amended 1987, 1990,
1994).
35. Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 1981-82 Ohio Laws 927, 954 (1982) (amended 1987, 1990, 1994).
The five factors were:
(1) The person has previously been convicted of a violation of section 4511.19 ...
(2) At the time of arrest, the person's driver's or chauffeur's license or permit or
nonresident operating privilege was suspended or revoked;
(3) The person caused death or serious physical harm to another person;
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tion of the case on the merits. 36 Also, the length of a "refusal" suspension was
increased from six months to one year.37
The five 1983 ALS factors, taken as a whole, related primarily to
whether the motorist was a future threat to public safety. For the first time
OMVI defendant, the judge made an individual determination, based on the
facts of the case and the background of the offender, as to the necessity of
issuing an ALS prior to trial. 38 Whether a defendant refused a test or tested
above the "per se" limit was not necessarily determinative of the judge's ALS
decision. Therefore, although the OMVI and the ALS moved along parallel
tracks, the actual decision to impose an ALS appeared to be primarily reme-
dial.
3. 1990-1993
Under the 1990 version of Ohio's implied consent provisions, an arrest-
ing officer was required to seize and suspend the driver's license of anyone
who refused the test or tested above the "per se" level. The officer would
forward the license to the court and the court would determine whether to
continue the pretrial suspension based on numerous statutorily enumerated
factors.3 9 Any pretrial suspension was ultimately credited towards a suspen-
sion imposed as a result of a conviction in the OMVI case.4°
At the time the arresting officer would seize the license, he would issue
the motorist a fifteen day temporary driving permit. If a hearing was re-
quested by the motorist, the hearing had to be held within 30 days. Only the
defendant could request a continuance of the hearing; however, a continuance
would not stay the running of the suspension.4" Enhanced suspensions were
(4) The person failed to appear at the initial appearance; or
(5) The court or referee determines that the person's continued driving will be a threat
to public safety.
36. Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 1981-82 Ohio Laws 927, 954 (amended 1987, 1990, 1994). Under
the 1983 revisions, an ALS is not a final, appealable order. City of Columbus v. Adams, 461
N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1984).
37. Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 1981-82 Ohio Laws 927, 949 (1982) (amended 1987, 1990, 1994);
see Packard, supra note 18, at 1014.
38. See Gonzales v. Franklin Cty. Mun. Ct., 595 F. Supp. 382, 387 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding
that pre-trial ALS did not violate due process because the suspension was contingent on the
trial judge's findings in the individual case).
39. Am. Sub. S.B. 131, 1989-90 Ohio Laws 558, 671 (1990) (amended 1993, 1994); See
PAINTER & LOOKER, supra note 16, at § 7.3.
40. Am. Sub. S.B. 131, 1989-90 Ohio Laws 588, 681 (1990) (amended 1993, 1994).
However in the case of a refusal suspension where the defendant did not plead guilty or no
contest to OMVI at the conclusion of the case, the refusal suspension would continue and run
its full course. Id. at 674; See Packard, supra note 18, at 1016.
41. Davis, supra note 7, at 701.
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provided for motorists with a history of refusing requested chemical tests.42
4. Present Scheme
Under the 1993 revisions, when the officer seizes and suspends a driver's
license, the officer immediately forwards the license to the Registrar. 43 The
ALS imposed at the time of arrest will not be reviewed by a court unless the
defendant files an appeal, 44 either before or at the "five-day hearing," which
is usually the arraignment. 45 The appeal must be filed in the court in which
the defendant will appear on the OMVI charge.4 6 If the defendant appeals the
suspension, the implied consent statute provides that "the appeal does not stay
the operation of the suspension,"4 7 that "no court has jurisdiction to grant a
stay of a suspension imposed"48 and "any order issued by any court that pur-
ports to grant a stay of any suspension imposed under either of those divisions
shall not be given administrative effect" by the Registrar.49 Although the
defendant, the prosecution, or the court on its own motion may continue the
hearing of the appeal, 50 the granting of a continuance does not stay the suspen-
sion that is the subject of the appeal.
51
If a defendant appeals the ALS, the defendant has the burden of prov-
ing, 52 by a preponderance of the evidence, that one or more of the specified
conditions of sections 451 1.19 1 (H)(1)(a)-(d) have not been met. 3 If all of the
42. Am. Sub. S.B. 131, 1989-90 Ohio Laws 558, 669 (1990) (amended 1993, 1994). If the
defendant refused to take one chemical test within the last five years, the period of suspension
was increased to two years. For two previous refusals in five years, the suspension lasts three
years. For three or more refusals, the defendant's license is suspended for five years.
43. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §4511.191(D)(1)(a) (Baldwin 1994).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (H)(1) (granting accused the right to appeal).
45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(G)(2) (Baldwin 1994) (five day hearing). See
PAINTER & LOOKER, supra note 16, at §§ 7.5 to 7.6.
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 1(H)(2) (Baldwin 1994).
53. Revised Code § 4511.191(H)(1) provides:
If the person appeals the suspension at his initial appearance, the scope of the appeal
is limited to determining whether one or more of the following conditions have not
been met:
(a) whether the officer had reasonable ground to believe the arrested person was
operating a vehicle ... within this state while under the influence of alcohol .... or
with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or urine and whether
the arrested person was in fact placed under arrest;
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conditions have been met (or if an individual does not appeal his suspension
at his initial appearance), the suspension is upheld and continued until the
complaint for which the defendant has been arrested is adjudicated on the
merits . 4 If the ALS was imposed for refusing to take a test, the ALS does not
terminate if the defendant proceeds to trial, regardless of the outcome of the
case. 5 If the ALS was imposed because the motorist refused to take a test, and
the defendant enters a guilty or no contest plea to OMVI, the ALS is termi-
nated and the Registrar is ordered to credit any time the person served for the
ALS against any judicial suspension.5 6 If the suspension was imposed for
testing over the "per se" level, the ALS suspension terminates if the person is
subsequently found not guilty of the charge resulting in the taking of the test
or tests under the statute. 7 Otherwise, the ALS is credited against any sus-
pension given by the court.
After a specified, initial period of absolute suspension, most ALS sus-
pensions permit a court to grant occupational driving privileges if the ALS
would seriously affect the person's ability to continue in the person's employ-
ment.5 The length of the unconditional suspension is dependent on the num-
ber of previous times an individual has either refused to take a requested test,
or has been convicted of OMVI. 59 At the end of an ALS suspension period,
the BMV is instructed to return the driver's license upon a showing of finan-
(b) whether the law enforcement officer requested the arrested person to submit to
the chemical test designated pursuant to division (A) of this section;
(c) whether the arresting officer informed the arrested person of the consequences
of refusing to be tested or of submitting to the test;
(d) Whichever of the following is applicable:
(i) Whether the arrested person refused to submit to the chemical test requested by
the officer; [or]
(ii) Whether the chemical test results indicate that his blood[,] [breath, or urine
contained an alcohol content above the "per se" limit].
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(2) (Baldwin 1994).
55. Id.
56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(K) (Baldwin 1994).
57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(2) (Baldwin 1994).
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (I)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
59. Id. There are a limited number of defendants who are prohibited from obtaining
occupational driving privileges under the ALS due to the severity of their past driving record.
See id. (providing that the court shall not grant occupational driving privileges to a person
who has either refused to take a chemical test or has been arrested for OMVI within the last
seven years). A driver's past record of convictions, or refusals to take requested chemical
tests, can mandate a maximum suspension of up to five years. See § 4511.191(E)(1)(b)-(d).
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cial responsibility60 and the payment of a $250 license reinstatement fee. 6 1
The proceeds of the fee are designated to a variety of drug treatment, rehabili-
tation, drug abuse and reparations programs specified in the statute.
62
Interestingly, when Ohio enacted the 1993 version of the ALS, it also
enacted a supplemental suspension statute in the event that the ALS was held
invalid and terminated by the trial court.63 Section 4511.196 provides that a
judge may impose a new suspension of a person's license if the judge deter-
mines at the initial appearance that the person's continued driving will be a
threat to public safety.64 The trial court also has the authority to implement
this suspension in cases where the ALS is inapplicable, such as where a de-
fendant is charged with being "under the influence" but has tested below the
"per se" limit, or where the defendant has been charged with being under the
influence of drugs of abuse. 65 Like the ALS, this "public safety" suspension
is credited against any suspension imposed at the conclusion of the OMVI
case.6 6 In the event a person is found not guilty of the charge, this suspension
is also terminated.6 7
III. OHIO'S ALS TRIGGERS DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION
The determination of whether the ALS bars a subsequent prosecution on
the substantive charge of OMVI depends on the outcome of a number of tests
traditionally employed to determine jeopardy protection. As will be shown,
courts throughout Ohio are not in agreement on any of the important issues
that the Ohio Supreme Court must confront in Gustafson this term.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "[no person shall.., be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. ' 68 Although the text of the
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(L)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(L)(2) (Baldwin 1994).
62. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(L)(2)(a-c)(Baldwin 1994).
63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196 (Baldwin 1994).
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196(B)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196(B)(2) (Baldwin 1994).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196(C) (Baldwin 1994).
67. Id.
68. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
Legal scholars have debated the precise origins of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The concept was present in the canon law, which commands that "there shall
not rise up a double affliction." See Francine Ward, The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1477, 1477 (1995) (citing 15 THE CIVIL LAW, bk.9, tit.
XXXI, at 56 (S. Scott ed., 1923)). The command was grounded in the belief that God did not
make one suffer twice for the same offence. Id.
Some scholars believe the principle of double jeopardy gained popular approval following
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provision mentions harms to "life and limb," traditionally the Amendment has
been applied to imprisonment and monetary penalties. 69 The clause has been
interpreted many times by the Court as protecting against three distinct
abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments
for the same offense.
70
"The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy
is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall
not have to marshal the resources and energies necessary for his defense more
than once for the same alleged criminal acts. ' 71 In practical terms, a statutory
scheme violates the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause when (1) the
sanction sought to be imposed is in a separate and subsequent proceeding;
72
(2) the proposed sanction constitutes "punishment; ' 73 and (3) the proposed
sanction is for the same conduct that was previously punished. 74 The Double
an altercation between Thomas Becket and Henry II.
Becket asserted that clerics who have committed a crime should be subject to only one
trial, and that the proceedings be adjudicated in an ecclesiastical court. Conceding
that the trial must take place in the ecclesiastical court, the King insisted that the
accusation also be made in the lay court. A deposed cleric, now a lay person, could
then be punished by the Crown. Becket objected in the name of the canon law,
specifically invoking the maxim that a person could not be punished twice for one
offense.
Id. at 1477-78 (citing F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 447-49
(2d ed. 1923)).
69. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 n.1 (1994).
70. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Because the guarantee "represents a fundamental ideal in our
constitutional heritage," it was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
This article focuses on the multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
71. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959). In an earlier case, Justice Black
explained the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause:
The underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
72. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not preclude the imposition of cumulative punishments in a single trial or proceeding).
73. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)
(stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense.")).
74. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) ("If two offenses are the same ...
for purposes of barring consecutive sentences at a single trial, they necessarily will be the
same for purposes of barring successive prosecutions."); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682
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Jeopardy Clause bars a second sanction, regardless of the order of the civil and
criminal proceedings, if both the first and second sanctions are deemed pun-
ishment.
75
A. The ALS Constitutes Punishment for Double Jeopardy Purposes
Until recently, courts rarely considered whether a sanction exacted in a
civil proceeding could either trigger jeopardy protection for a subsequent
criminal prosecution, or be barred by a previous criminal prosecution.
76
However, three recent United States Supreme Court cases concerning the
scope of "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause and its application
to civil forfeiture cases have led practitioners and courts to consider the ap-
plication of the same principles to OMVI statutory schemes providing sanc-
tions in both criminal and "civil" proceedings.
1. The "Right versus Privilege" Argument
Courts often begin their analysis of whether the suspension of a driver's
license is punishment by noting that a license to operate a motor vehicle is a
"privilege" rather than a "right."77 These decisions imply that the negation
of a mere privilege should not be viewed as sufficiently punitive to trigger the
protections of the Fifth Amendment. However, the characterization of a
driver's license as a privilege or a right has very little bearing on the protec-
tion the Constitution affords an individual when the state attempts to revoke
or suspend a license. Otherwise, simplistic draftsmanship, creating formal-
istic rather than substantive distinctions in language, could defeat constitu-
tional guarantees.
The Supreme Court has recognized that once driver's licenses are issued,
(1977) (holding that a subsequent robbery prosecution was invalidated after the defendant
was previously convicted of felony murder).
75. "[I]f there is a constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments, the order of
punishment cannot possibly make any difference." Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See United States v.
Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d
1126, 1127 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990). See also David S. Rudstein,
Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some
Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587, 601 n.83 (1993).
76. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) (holding
that the defendant's acquittal on criminal charges did not bar a subsequent forfeiture); United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (holding that courts were to defer to Congress'
label of whether a proceeding is "civil" rather than "criminal").
77. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 554 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ohio 1977);
State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995). Possession of a driver's
license has also been characterized as a "substantial right." Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles v.
Williams, 647 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a liveli-
hood, 78 and represents a protectible property interest under the Due Process
Clause. 79 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that suspension of
entitlements, such as licenses, are not to be taken away without procedural due
process - whether the entitlement is denominated a right or a privilege.8 For
example, in Mackey v. Montrym,8 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that due process did not require a pre-suspension hearing triggered by the
refusal of a licensee to take a breath test for the presence of alcohol.82 How-
ever, the characterization of a license to drive as being either a "right" or a
"privilege" was not pivotal to the holding.
The characterization of a license as a "right" or a "privilege" is just as
immaterial in determining whether the suspension of a license constitutes
punishment for double jeopardy analysis. Regardless of the label given by the
state, some license suspensions have traditionally been considered punish-
ment. One need look no further than Ohio's OMVI law, which provides for
a license suspension, indexed to the past record of the offender, as one of
multiple punishments for the offense. 83 Ohio law also provides for license
78. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 538 (1971).
79. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977).
Ohio constitutional due process guarantees embodied in Article I, sections 1, 16 and 19,
provide substantially the same safeguards as does the Fourteenth Amendment. Peebles v.
Clement, 408 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Ohio 1980); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 67
(Ohio 1980).
80. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 10 n.7; Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112. See also People v. Linder,
535 N.E.2d 829, 831 (Ill. 1989) (a driver's license is a property interest for purposes of the
Due Process Clause); State v. Toriello, 654 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995) ("A
driver's license does confer a limited property interest on its owner and a person may not be
deprived of it without [due process of law].").
81. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
82. The Massachusetts statute at issue in Mackey provided that an individual could obtain
an immediate hearing (within one to ten days) before the Registrar as to whether grounds
existed for the suspension. The Registrar was without authority to issue a stay of the suspension
pending the hearing. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 8 n.5. The Court recognized that a licensee's
interest in a pre-suspension hearing is substantial, however, the licensee's interest was
outweighed by what the Court termed the relatively small risk of error in the Registrar's
decision to suspend for a refusal, as well as the substantial weight to be accorded to the states
in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety, such as removing drunk
drivers from the highways.
83. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A)(1)-(4) (Baldwin 1994) (effective 5-1-95) provides
for mandatory incarceration and fines, indexed to a defendant's prior record, "in addition to
the license suspension or revocation provided in section 4507.16 of the Revised Code .. "
Section 4507.16(B) of the Code provides for a license suspension of defendants convicted of
OMVI, "in addition to or independent of all other penalties provided by law or by ordinance
.... .(emphasis added). Further, § 4507.16(A)(l)-(7) provides for license suspensions, "in
addition to or independent of all other penalties .... " for anyone convicted of such diverse
offenses as perjury or the making of a false affidavit concerning the registration of motor
vehicles, committing a felony with the use of a motor vehicle, trafficking in cigarettes with
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suspensions as punishment for drug and alcohol offenses.84 Likewise, some
license restrictions and suspensions are unquestionably remedial, such as the
denial or revocation of driving privileges to alcoholics and drug addicts."
Instead, whether the ALS constitutes punishment should be analyzed
according to the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in its double
jeopardy cases. An appropriate starting point is an examination of the trio of
cases from the United States Supreme Court which focused the country's
attention on the definition of "punishment" in civil cases.8 6
the intent to avoid payment of the cigarette tax, as well as more traditional, serious traffic
offenses, such as drag racing, failing to stop after an accident and vehicular homicide.
(emphasis added).
84. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.163(A) (Baldwin 1994) (mandating the forfeiture of a
driver's license for one year if the licensee uses a fictitious or altered license to purchase
liquor or beer); § 4507.165 (suspension for passing school bus); § 4507.166 (suspension for
causing death while fleeing officer); § 4507.34 (suspension or revocation for reckless
operation); § 2925.02(E) (mandating, in addition to any other penalty imposed for corrupting
another with drugs, a two year driver's rights suspension). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2925.03(M), 2925.11 (F)(1), 2925.12(E), 2925.13(E), 2925.14(H), 2925.22(D), 2925.23(H),
2925.31(D), 2925.32(G), 2925.36(E), 2925.37(M).
The license suspensions mandated for drug offenses, like the ALS, are also the result of a
federal mandate tied to highway traffic safety funds. See 23 U.S.C. § 159(a)(l)-(3)
(withholding federal highway funds from any state that does not enact a law suspending the
driver's license from an individual convicted of "drug offenses"). Some courts, applying
minimal scrutiny, have held these suspensions to be unconstitutional deprivations of a property
or liberty interest pursuant to the Due Process Clause. These courts have reasoned that
although deterring the drug trade is a legitimate, if not important, governmental interest,
suspending a drug offender's driver's license is not rationally related to that goal. Driving a
car and dealing in drugs have very little to do with one another, especially when one considers
that in most license seizure cases, the underlying drug offenses do not require the use of a
vehicle during the commission of the offense as a prerequisite for the suspension. Neither are
such suspensions a reasonable method to accomplish the alternative goal of the safe and legal
operation of motor vehicles upon the highways. See, e.g., People v. Linder, 535 N.E.2d 829,
833 (I11. 1989); State v. Gowdy, 639 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ohio C.P. 1994).
In Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, the Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded
that a statutory scheme which required the State Department of Revenue and Taxation to
suspend a driver's license after the individual had been convicted of a drug or alcohol offense
violated the double jeopardy provisions of the Wyoming and Federal Constitutions. 838 P.2d
158, 160 (Wyo 1992). The administrative suspension, effected after sentencing, was held to
be "driven by deterrent and retribution concepts." Id. at 179. The suspension was not dependent
on the use of a motor vehicle in the commission of an offense and, therefore, was held not
related to public safety concerns. Instead, the suspension was held to impose an additional
punishment. Id. at 180. Contra Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340,
344 (Mass. 1992) (deprivation of driver's licenses could rationally be considered to deter
drug sales). For a general discussion, see Rudstein, supra note 75, at 640 n.290.
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.08(A) (Baldwin 1994) (denial of temporary permits to
addicts and alcoholics); § 4507.161 (suspension of license if adjudicated incompetent for the
purpose of holding a license).
86. See, e.g., Drunk Driving Defense Rejected by Eight Appeals Courts, LAW. WKLY. USA,
July 3, 1995, at 1, 12.
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2. The Halper-Austin-Kurth Ranch Trilogy
a. United States v. Halper
In United States v. Halper,87 the Court re-examined18 the circumstances
under which a civil monetary penalty may constitute "punishment" for the
purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Halper, a medical lab manager, duped
Blue Cross into reimbursing him for 65 claims based on mischaracterizations
of the medical services performed. 89 The mischaracterizations resulted in
overpayments totalling $585. Halper was convicted on 65 counts of violat-
ing the criminal false-claims statute, as well as 16 counts of mail fraud. 90 He
was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and fined $5,000.
The government then brought an action under the civil False Claims Act,
which provided for a mandatory civil penalty of not less than $2,000 per vio-
lation, an amount equal to twice the amount of damages the government sus-
tained per violation, and the costs of the civil action.91 Having violated the Act
65 times, Halper appeared to be subject to a statutory penalty of more than
$130,000.92 Instead, the district court held the civil sanction of $130,000, an
amount more than 220 times greater than the government's measurable loss,
qualified as punishment and was barred by Halper's prior criminal conviction.
The trial court permitted the government to recover double damages of $1,170
and the costs of the civil action, but held the statutory sanction of $2,000 per
violation unconstitutional as applied to Halper. 93 The government took a di-
rect appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
94
87. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
88. A series of opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court, prior to Halper, held
that civil monetary penalties are merely remedial, primarily because such penalties are usually
designed to roughly but appropriately compensate the government for any expenses incurred
as a result of the defendant's conduct. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956)
(Surplus Property Act liquidated damages provision served to reimburse the government for
investigation and enforcement expenses); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943) (qui tam action was remedial and designed to protect the government from financial
loss); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (civil tax penalty reimburses government
for costs of investigating fraud and is not punishment).
89. The details of Halper's fraud, characterized as "of little importance with respect to his
double jeopardy claim," are set forth in Halper, 490 U.S. at 437 n.2.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) (false claims); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud).
91. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994). The Federal False Claims Act was amended in 1986
and increased the civil penalty to "not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus 3
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains," in addition to the costs sustained
by the Government in bringing the proceeding. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified
as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)).
92. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 438 (1989).
93. See United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 534 (1987).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994).
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In rejecting the government's contention that punishment can only be
inflicted in criminal proceedings, a unanimous Court held that whether an
action is designated "civil" or "criminal" is "not of paramount importance"
in determining whether a sanction is punishment. Rather,
[t]he notion of punishment.., cuts across the division between the civil
and the criminal law .... To that end, the determination whether a given
civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a
particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the
penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a crimi-
nal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment.95
The Court previously had held that the goals of punishment are retribution
and deterrence. 96 Therefore, "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment," and is subject to the
prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
97
The Court recognized that the inquiry concerning when a sanction is
remedial, and when it may fairly be characterized as punishment, "will not be
an exact pursuit" and the government is entitled to some latitude ("rough
remedial justice") 98 where the actual amount of government "damages and
costs may be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain." 99 Civil fixed-penalty
provisions, as well as reasonable liquidated damages clauses, are contem-
plated within the scope of remedial sanctions which may compensate the
government in a given case. 100 However, where a defendant has previously
sustained a criminal penalty and the subsequent civil sanction
bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for
its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain mean-
ing of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the
95. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48. See also id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (whether a
sanction constitutes punishment is an objective inquiry "grounded in the nature of the sanction
and the facts of the particular case.").
96. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
97. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) ("[A] defendant who already
has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction
to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as
a deterrent or retribution.").
98. Id. at 446.
99. Id. at 449.
100. Moreover, civil suits seeking damages filed by a private party for conduct that
previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment do not trigger jeopardy
protection. The Court expressed no opinion concerning whether a qui tam action, in which a
private party brings suit in the name of the United States and shares with the government any
proceeds of the action, can trigger the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See 31
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Government's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact
constitutes a second punishment.' 0'
In Halper, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the
potential $130,000 liability was "sufficiently disproportionate that the sanc-
tion constitute[d] a second punishment in violation of double jeopardy." The
Court remanded the case to permit the government to demonstrate what, if
any, portion of the $130,000 might be validly assessed to compensate the
government for its losses and costs.
b. Austin v. United States
The Court quickly revisited the issue of when a civil sanction can appro-
priately be characterized as punishment in Austin v. United States. 0 2 Austin
had sold one ounce of cocaine to undercover drug agents. He pled guilty to
a state drug trafficking charge and was sent to prison for seven years. One
month later, the United States filed a civil in rem forfeiture action seeking
forfeiture of his mobile home and auto body shop, where the cocaine was
stored and sold, respectively. The district court rejected his argument that the
forfeiture of the properties would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.'0 3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals "reluctantly
agree[d] with the government" and affirmed. 0 4 Although the Eighth Circuit
believed the government was "exacting too high a penalty in relation to the
offense committed,"'' 5 it felt prior Supreme Court precedent, permitting for-
feitures of arguably innocent owners, 0 6 made it extremely unlikely that the
Constitution would require proportionality review of forfeitures where indi-
U.S.C. § 3730 (1994) (authorizing civil actions for false claims submitted to the Government).
However, the Court noted that double jeopardy protection had not been foreclosed in United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). Halper, 490 U.S. at 551 n.ll.
101. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50.
102. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
103. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST., amend.
VIII.
104. United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). Austin could not raise a cognizable
double jeopardy claim because the criminal case and the civil in rem forfeiture case involved
different sovereigns. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent a person from being tried and punished by both the
federal and a state government); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (holding that separate
trials for federal and state armed robbery offenses are not barred by Double Jeopardy Clause);
see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (holding that a defendant may be prosecuted
and punished for the same offense by two different states).
105. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d at 817.
106. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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viduals had pled guilty to criminal offenses involving the property.10 7
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. After concluding that the
prohibition contained in the Excessive Fines Clause applies to both civil and
criminal cases, the Court directly addressed the issue of whether a civil in rem
forfeiture could constitute punishment.""8 The Court repeatedly cited to
Halper'0 9 in reaffirming that sanctions frequently serve multiple purposes, and
a sanction designed, in part, to serve "retributive or deterrent purposes, is pun-
ishment, as we have come to understand the term."' 10 After concluding that
the history of forfeiture laws in both England and the United States had a pu-
nitive aspect, the Court noted that the statutory scheme tethered forfeiture to
the commission of a drug offense, and the legislative history characterized
forfeiture as "a powerful deterrent" and penal in nature."' In light of the his-
torical understanding of forfeiture as punishment and the legislative history
of the statutory scheme, the Court concluded that a civil in rem forfeiture does
not serve "solely a remedial purpose" and is subject to the limitations of the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause."
2
c. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch
In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,"3 the Supreme
Court was asked to decide a permutation on the theme of Halper: whether a
tax on the possession of illegal drugs, assessed in an administrative proceed-
ing, violates the constitutional prohibition against successive punishments for
the same offense, when a state had already imposed a criminal penalty for the
same conduct."I4
107. Id. See also United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Jaffee v. United States, 493 U.S. 954 (1989).
108. Although the Court could have considered the issue of "punishment" solely within the
context of the Excessive Fines Clause, and conceivably have developed a test which differed
from the tests developed in the double jeopardy line of cases, it did not. The repeated citations
to Halper and Mendoza-Martinez, etc., make it clear that what constitutes punishment for the
Excessive Fines Clause will also qualify as punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.
109. See United States v. Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806, 2810 n.12, 2812 (1993).
110. Id. at 2806 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
111. Id. at 2810-12.
112. Id. at 2812. The Court remanded the case to determine the appropriate test for
determining when a forfeiture becomes constitutionally excessive.
113. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
114. Prior to Kurth Ranch, the Court had never invalidated a tax on double jeopardy grounds,
although the Court had recognized the possibility in United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568
(1931). In La Franca, the Court invalidated a liquor tax assessed only against those prosecuted
for illegal manufacture or sale of liquor on statutory grounds, thus avoiding the "grave
constitutional question" of whether double jeopardy principles precluded such an assessment.
Id. at 574, 576.
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Six members of the Kurth family were charged with various counts of
cultivation and distribution of marijuana. The Kurths pled guilty and were
sentenced. Subsequently, a civil forfeiture action was filed and settled by the
family for $18,016.83. A third proceeding was then initiated, involving an
assessment by the Department of Revenue ("DOR") of almost $900,000 in
taxes under a newly enacted Dangerous Drug Tax. The Kurths filed a petition
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, wherein they challenged both the proof of
claim for the unpaid drug taxes and the constitutionality of the Montana tax. 15
The Montana taxing scheme imposed a tax on the possession and stor-
age of drugs, which could only be collected after any state or federal fines or
forfeitures had been satisfied. The tax was either ten percent of the assessed
market value of the drugs, as assessed by the DOR, or a specified amount de-
pending on the drug. A return was requested to be filed by the taxpayer within
72 hours of arrest and, if the taxpayer refused to do so, the law enforcement
officer is required to file the form. There was no obligation to file a return or
pay any tax unless and until the taxpayer was arrested.
16
The Bankruptcy Court held the assessment invalid under the Federal
Constitution." 7 Relying primarily on Halper, the court held the tax consti-
tuted a form of double jeopardy. 18 The DOR refused to produce any evidence
concerning the remedial aspects of the tax, and the assessment, which resulted
in a tax eight times the product's market value, made the punitive aspects of
the tax evident."19 Both the district court 20 and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.
121
As in Halper, the Supreme Court recognized that a legislature's descrip-
tion of a statute as a "tax" does not foreclose an inquiry into whether, at some
point, the provision loses its character as such and becomes a penalty.
22
Distinguishing Halper, the Court recognized that Halper's test of determin-
ing whether a sanction is remedial or punitive (a comparison of the
individual's gain to the amount of the sanction, including the government's
loss) is inappropriate in the case of a tax statute.123 Instead, the Court engaged
in a sanction-specific, objective inquiry in making the determination that the
115. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
116. Id. at 1941-42.
117. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 76 (Bnkr. D. Mont. 1991).
118. Id. at 75-76.
119. Id. at 74.
120. In re Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-PGH, 1991 WL 365065, at *4 (D. Mont. Apr. 23,
1991).
121. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993).
122. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945-46 (1994).
See also Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934).
123. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948; Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Winter 1996]
23
Kravitz: Ohio's Administrative License Suspension
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON LAW REVIEW
tax constituted a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The Court noted the unusual features of the Montana tax. The "re-
markably high" assessment, set at eight times the market value of the drug,
unquestionably was designed to deter the drug trade. More importantly, the
tax, "exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested for the precise conduct
that gives rise to the tax obligation in the first place," clearly differentiated the
tax from "mixed-motive taxes that governments impose both to deter a disfa-
vored activity and to raise money. "124 Finally, the Court thought it anomalous,
if not disingenuous, that a purported tax on the "possession" and "storage" of
dangerous drugs is levied on "goods that the taxpayer neither owns nor
possesses when the tax is imposed .... This tax, imposed on criminals and
no others, departs so far from normal revenue laws as to become a form of
punishment. 1 25 Therefore, the imposition of the tax at a subsequent proceed-
ing is a second punishment within the contemplation of double jeopardy pro-
tection.
26
3. Ohio Decisions Concerning the Punitive Nature of the ALS
There is no consensus in Ohio court decisions as to whether an ALS
suspension constitutes punishment. Currently, three decisions characterize
the imposition of an ALS as punishment,1 27 and nine cases characterize the
ALS as primarily remedial. 28 Of the nine cases holding the ALS is remedial,
two of the cases have strong dissents,'2 9 and one case would have held differ-
124. Id. at 1947.
125. Id. at 1948.
126. The Court noted that Montana could have attempted to collect its tax if it had not
previously punished the taxpayer for the same offense, or if it had assessed the tax in the
same proceeding that resulted in his conviction. Id. at 1945. See United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 450 (1988) (noting that "[n]othing in today's ruling ... prevent[s] the Government
from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized
criminal penalties in the same proceeding."); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983).
Of course, the attempt to impose cumulative penalties during the criminal case would still be
subject to a proportionality inquiry under the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
127. State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA-232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June
27), appeal granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995); State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995).
128. City of Whitehall v. Weese, No. 95 APC02-169, 1995 WL 614139 (Ohio Ct. App.,
10th Dist., Oct. 17, 1995); State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350 (Ohio Ct.
App., 10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995); State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct.
App., 12th Dist., Aug. 21, 1995); State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL 275770 (Ohio Ct.
App., 3d Dist., May 12), appeal granted, 655 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995); State v. Harrison, 654
N.E.2d 210 (Ohio C.P. 1995); State v. Toriello, 654 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995);
State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646
N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995).
129. Weese, 1995 WL 614139, at *6 (Close, J., dissenting); Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350, at
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ently if the issue were a matter of first impression. 130
The predominant theme in the decisions holding that the ALS is not
punishment is that the traditional purpose behind the ALS, gleaned from prior
case law, 3' has been to protect the public from intoxicated drivers - not to
punish the licensee.' 32 However, these decisions also recognized the necessity
of revisiting the issue of punishment in light of the substantial changes to the
ALS statute in 1993, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's recent willingness
to examine civil and administrative schemes to determine whether they con-
stitute punishment. 33 Most Ohio courts undertook to revisit the issue
"through the Halper lens."'
134
Although Halper is not free from ambiguity, 35 most Ohio courts inter-
preted Halper as adopting a disproportionality test to determine when a civil
sanction should properly be considered punishment. Thus, the issue became
whether the ALS sanction was "the rare case," 136 where the "civil or presum-
ably administrative remedy may be so extreme, so outrageous and so dispro-
portionate, that it could only be fairly characterized as punitive rather than
remedial." 137 Not surprisingly, courts employing this test found the current
*8 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
130. Harrison, 654 N.E.2d at 212 ("This court lacks the authority [to disagree with the
Ohio Supreme Court], irrespective [sic] of how at odds it seems to be with common sense.").
131. Ohio's ALS statute does not set forth the public policy behind the 1993 revisions.
Miller, 1995 WL 275770, at *3. Nor does Ohio maintain a legislative history for its statutory
enactments. State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 600 (Ohio 1971).
132. Miller, 1995 WL 275770, *3. See City of Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890
(Ohio 1984) ("That additional interest is in the preservation of safety on this state's highways
by reducing the risk of property damage, serious physical injury, and death caused by persons
who operate motor vehicles while under the influence of alcohol."); Andrews v. Turner, 368
N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (Ohio 1977); State v. Starnes, 254 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Ohio 1970); Stalego
v. McCollion, 477 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); State v. Hurbean, 261 N.E.2d
290, 300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970). See also Mackey v. Montrym, 433 U.S. 1, 17 (1977)
(Massachusetts ALS enacted "for the purpose of protecting the safety of its people" and the
Supreme Court has "traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary
procedures to protect the public health and safety.").
133. Although the Supreme Court has characterized the Halper inquiry as reserved for the
"rare case... where a defendant previously sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty
bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its losses," United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1988) (emphasis added), the Court quickly revisited the
Halper punishment issue in Austin and Kurth Ranch. Moreover, since Halper, lower courts
have not been reluctant to bar criminal and civil penalties on Double Jeopardy grounds. See,
e.g., DAVID SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES (Mathew Bender)
12.10 (1995) and cases cited therein.
134. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (1994)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. See discussion infra part Part III(A)(5).
136. See, e.g., State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (1992).
137. State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995).
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ALS merely remedial. 13 8
These decisions further emphasized that the ALS had been characterized
as civil, administrative and remedial in case law for the past 25 years. At least
two decisions capitalized on the perceived distinction between a "right" and
the "privilege" to operate a motor vehicle. In State v. Uncapher, the municipal
court held, without elaboration and notwithstanding that some license suspen-
sions clearly constitute punishment, that "if the privilege to drive is not a right,
then the deprivation would not be punishment in the sense we normally apply
the term."13 9 Similarly, the Tenth District Court of Appeals, in State v. Elfrink,
determined that the revocation of a conditional privilege merely returns the
parties to their pre-contract status. Therefore, the ALS remedy "is in the
nature of restitution"140 and, thus, remedial. The "sting of punishment"''
flowing from the remedial sanction was not sufficiently severe to outweigh
the legitimate purposes of the statutory scheme.
The cases holding that an ALS constitutes punishment also examined the
issue primarily on the basis of Halper. However, these decisions focused on
Halper's recognition that a sanction constitutes punishment when the sanc-
tion serves the goals of punishment, such as retribution and deterrence.'42
Rather than utilizing a disproportionality analysis, these courts 143 read Halper
as employing a mixed-motive test, which requires a sanction to be character-
ized as punishment if the sanction "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either re-
tributive or deterrent purposes." 144 Because even the United States Supreme
Court noted that an ALS serves as a deterrent to drunk driving, 4 5 these courts
were hard-pressed to characterize the ALS as anything but punishment once
138. State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist., Aug.
21), appeal granted, 656 N.E.2d 346 (Ohio 1995); State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL
275770 (Ohio Ct. App., 3d Dist., May 12), appeal granted, 655 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995);
State v. Toriello, 654 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995). Many Ohio courts did note that the
Halper decision was unsuited for determining whether the ALS constituted punishment. See,
e.g., State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist.,
Oct. 5, 1995).
139. Uncpaher, 650 N.E.2d at 202.
140. Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350, at *7.
141. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989). See Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350,
at *6.
142. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 ("We have recognized in other contexts that punishment
serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence.").
143. Id. (emphasis added). See State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA-232, 1995 WL 387619
(Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June 27), appeal granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995); State v.
Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995).
144. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (emphasis added).
145. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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they had adopted the "not-solely-remedial" test. 4 6
4. The Difficulty with Prior Ohio Decisions Concerning the ALS
As a threshold matter, decisions from the 1970s, characterizing the ALS
as civil, administrative and remedial, are of very little help in determining
whether the current ALS sanction constitutes punishment. Ohio's present
scheme bears little resemblance to the system in place at that time.'47 At the
time that decisions such as State v. Starnes, State v. Hurbean and Andrews v.
Turner14 were rendered, the ALS was primarily concerned with motorists
who refused requested alcohol tests. After receiving notice of an ALS by mail
from the Registrar, the motorist could petition for a hearing to contest the
suspension, and the suspension would be stayed until the termination of any
hearing or any appeal. 149 Since imposition of the ALS could conceivably be
delayed for years, this scheme, although characterized as civil and adminis-
trative, is hard to justify as being remedial. Instead, although civil in nature,
it was clearly a penalty to encourage motorists to take requested tests and to
penalize motorists who impeded the collection of relevant evidence. 5 °
The 1983 amendments increased the scope of the ALS to include "fail-
ures" as well as "refusals."'' The court made an immediate determination
(within five days of arrest) if one of five statutorily enumerated factors was
present. 52 Although the OMVI and the ALS moved along parallel tracks, the
actual decision to impose an ALS appeared to be primarily remedial because
it did not focus on the culpability of the actor, but rather was dependent on the
146. The Halper rationale was adopted in the civil forfeiture context by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion
amended, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 64
U.S.L.W. 3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346). Quoting from
United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit stated:
"[a]ppellants contend that [the Halper] language means that unless a sanction is 'solely'
remedial, i.e., not serving deterrent or retributive ends, it is punishment. This position is
confirmed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Austin v. United States." $405,089.23, 33
F.3d at 1219.
147. See discussion of the pre-1983 ALS at supra Part II(B)(1).
148. See supra note 28.
149. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 380, 1967-68 Ohio Laws 1636 (1967) (amended 1969, 1972, 1975,
1977, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) (previous Revised Code §
4411.191(D)); Andrews v. Turner, 368 N.E.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Ohio 1977). Moreover,
occupational driving privileges were available at the moment of suspension.
150. In State v. Beltz, 654 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995), the court noted that the
Ohio Supreme Court "has ...recognized that such a refusal does not go unpunished."
(emphasis added).
151. See discussion supra Part II(B)(2).
152. See supra note 35. Under the 1983 revisions, an ALS was not a final, appealable
order. City of Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1984).
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motorist's potential for inflicting future harm by operating a motor vehicle.
The 1990 amendments began the transformation of the ALS from being
a primarily remedial scheme to one more closely associated with punish-
ment.'53 The arresting officer would seize and suspend a motorist's license
and forward it to the court having jurisdiction of the OMVI charge, although
a fifteen day temporary driving permit would be issued contemporaneously
with the suspension. Enhanced suspensions were provided for motorists with
a history of refusing requested chemical tests. The court still had some dis-
cretion to stay the ALS if the motorist was not a threat to public safety.
The 1993 amendments completed the process of revision.'54 Upon arrest
for OMVI, the officer seizes and suspends the motorist's license and imme-
diately forwards the license to the Registrar. The suspension will not be re-
viewed unless the defendant files an "appeal" prior to the "five day hearing."
This immediate hearing is oftentimes illusory, because either party or the
court can request that it be continued, and a continuance cannot stay the
ALS. 155 The inquiry at the ALS hearing is limited to whether the ALS was
imposed in a procedurally proper manner, rather than whether the motorist is
a threat to public safety. Regardless of the decision of the trial court concern-
ing the imposition of the ALS, the motorist will already have been subject to
a license suspension, without occupational privileges, for a considerable
period of time.
The ALS is inextricably connected to the conclusion of the OMVI case.
If an acquittal results, the ALS is terminated (except in the case of a "refusal").
If conviction ensues, the ALS is credited against any suspension given by the
court. The ALS also triggers a $250.00 reinstatement fee independent of any
other penalties or reinstatement fees imposed on the defendant.
156
5. The Ineffectiveness of Halper In Determining if a Non-Monetary
Civil Sanction is Punishment
In determining whether the ALS constitutes punishment, as the Ohio
Supreme Court must do when considering the Gustafson case, one must ask
153. See discussion of the 1990 amendments, supra at Part II(B)(3).
154. See discussion of the 1993 amendments, supra at Part II(B)(5).
155. But see discussion of Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APCO1-83, 1995 WL
527769 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995), infra note 367.
The practice in Franklin County is for the arraignment court to continue the ALS until it is
assigned to the judge presiding in the OMVI case. Since many of the issues contested at an
ALS hearing, i.e., reasonable grounds to arrest for OMVI, will entail an evidentiary hearing
which an arraignment court is not equipped to hear, the author believes the Franklin County
procedure is being repeated in most courts throughout the state.
156. In Manning v. City of Columbus, the Solicitor General of Ohio characterized the
$250.00 ALS reinstatement fee as a "fine." No. C-2-95-613 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 1995)
(available from court).
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whether Halper provides a suitable framework for assessing the proper clas-
sification of a civil, non-monetary, mixed-motive sanction. 57 Is it possible
to reconcile the ambiguity of Halper-"not solely remedial" v. "grossly dis-
proportionate"- in order to reach a determination as to whether the ALS is
punitive or remedial? How does one quantify and weigh the punitive aspects
of the ALS against the remedial aspects of the legislation in order to determine
the extent of disproportionality? Is the outcome of any weighing process
inevitably predetermined using a disproportionality test because the punitive
aspects of any scheme involving potential drunk drivers will never be dispro-
portionate to the carnage and loss of life resulting from drunk drivers on the
highways? If so, what are the limits that the Constitution places on this type
of legislation?
The difficulty of using Halper as a guide for future cases involving non-
monetary, civil sanctions was quickly realized by the Supreme Court. In
Kurth Ranch, the Court endorsed Halper's recognition that "civil" penalties
may, under some circumstances, trigger double jeopardy protection. How-
ever, Halper's analysis was not a sufficient substitute for an individual inquiry
into the nature of the particular sanction. Thus, in Kurth Ranch, the Court
found that "the Halper method of determining whether the exaction was re-
medial or punitive simply does not work.in the case of a tax statute.
'1 58
Halper does, however, provide some guidance concerning the nature of
the inquiry when non-monetary, non-restitution civil sanctions are employed
by a jurisdiction in order to achieve desirable, social goals. Nowhere in the
Halper opinion does the Court limit the decision to monetary sanctions. The
157. Most cases which examine whether an ALS can trigger double jeopardy protection
begin with, and sometimes end with, an application of Halper. See, e.g., State v. Nichols,
819 P.2d 995, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Davidson v. Mackinnon, 656 So.2d 223, 224 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Funke, 531 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995); State v. Maze, 825 P.2d
1169, 1174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Butler v. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 609 So.2d
790, 795 (La. 1992); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 202 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); State v.
Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 273
(Neb. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App., 12th Dist., Aug. 21), appeal granted, 656 N.E.2d 346 (Ohio 1995); State v. Harrison,
654 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ohio C.P. 1995). Others acknowledge that the Halper matrix does not
work well for non-monetary civil sanctions, but ultimately hold that the punitive aspects of
the ALS are not so disproportionate as to trigger jeopardy protection. See State v. Elfrink,
No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995); State
v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995). Other cases abandon the Halper
framework in search of some other rationale, such as the distinction between a "right" and a
"privilege." See, e.g., State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 752 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me. 1995). Some cases acknowledge that Halper is unsuitable
for the nature of the inquiry. See, e.g., Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991); State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 514
(Ver. 1992).
158. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
See also id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court speaks to "an additional second sanction," without restriction or quali-
fication. 59 What the Halper Court did require was a "particularized assess-
ment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be
said to serve."' 160 The inquiry is necessarily objective, because from the
defendant's perspective, "even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punish-
ment."
161
Justice Kennedy, in a brief concurring opinion, stressed the nature of the
objective inquiry.
Today's holding, I would stress, constitutes an objective rule that is
grounded in the nature of the sanction and the facts of the particular case.
It does not authorize courts to undertake a broad inquiry into the subjec-
tive purposes that may be thought to lie behind a given judicial proceed-
ing. Such an inquiry would be amorphous and speculative, and would
mire the courts in the quagmire of differentiating among the multiple
purposes that underlie every proceeding, whether it be civil or criminal in
name. It also would breed confusion among legislators who seek to struc-
ture the mechanisms of proper law enforcement within constitutional
commands. In approaching the sometimes difficult question whether an
enactment constitutes what must be deemed a punishment, we have rec-
ognized that a number of objective factors bear on the inquiry.1
62
Therefore, when considering the important question of when a civil sanction
should be considered punishment triggering double jeopardy protection, the
Halper Court anticipated a sanction-specific, objective evaluation directed to
"the purposes actually served by the sanction in question," without regard to
"the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction."'63
Some civil sanctions cannot be sufficiently analyzed solely on the basis
of retribution and deterrence. 164 A license suspension, which unquestionably
has both remedial and punitive qualities, and which has historically been
justified on both grounds, appears to be one of those sanctions incapable of
resolution using the Halper matrix. Instead, when in undertaking an assess-
ment of whether a mixed-motive, non-monetary sanction, such as a license
suspension, should be designated sufficiently punitive as to bar a subsequent
penalty for the same conduct, the Ohio Supreme Court should apply the multi-
159. Rudstein, supra note 75, at 625.
160. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
161. Id. at 447 n.7.
162. Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 447 n.7.
164. "Halper's focus on whether the sanction serves the goals of 'retribution and deterrence'
is just one factor in the Kennedy-Ward test, and one factor alone is not dispositive." Department
of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)(citations omitted).
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factored test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 61 - a test repeatedly
cited with approval in the trilogy.
6. The Mendoza-Martinez-Ward Tests to Determine if the ALS
is Punishment
In Kennedy v. Mendoza -Martinez, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether the loss of citizenship, for remaining outside the country in time of
war or national emergency in order to avoid military service, was penal in
character. The case concerned whether this civil penalty should be reclassi-
fied as criminal. If so, then the appellees were denied due process of law by
being denied various safeguards which attend criminal prosecutions under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 166 In determining whether the non-monetary
sanction of loss of citizenship was punitive, the Court set forth a multi-fac-
tored test:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may point in differing
directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the
penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the
statute on its face.
67
The Court continued:
Here, although we are convinced that application of these criteria to the
face of the statutes supports the conclusion that they are punitive, a de-
tailed examination along such lines is unnecessary, because the objective
manifestations of congressional purpose indicate conclusively that the
165. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
166. It is not the purpose of this paper to determine what safeguards must be afforded in a
"civil" proceeding that metes out punishment. In the civil forfeiture context, for example, a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not exist, because the Sixth Amendment begins "at or
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings," Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972), is case specific, McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991), and concludes
at the time of sentencing. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). See, e.g., United States
v. $292,888.04, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).
However, when balancing the due process factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 219 (1976), a court has discretionary authority to appoint counsel under the Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. That Certain Real Property, 798 F. Supp. 1540 (N.D. Ala.
1992). Cf. State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1980).
167. Mendoza -Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
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provisions in question can only be interpreted as punitive.168
The Court elaborated on the Mendoza-Martinez criteria in United States
v. Ward.169 The Court was left to determine whether a monetary penalty
imposed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was civil, or whether it
was sufficiently criminal that it triggered criminal constitutional protections.
The Court set forth a two-step process:
First, it is necessary to determine whether Congress, in establishing the
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a prefer-
ence for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, further inquiry is necessary to deter-
mine if the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate that intention. 170
In applying the analysis to the case subjudice, the Court, despite Congress'
"manifest intention to establish a civil, remedial mechanism," 171 considered
whether the scheme "nevertheless provided for sanctions so punitive as to
'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal pen-
alty.' ' ' 172 In making its determination, the Court utilized the factors set forth
in Mendoza -Martinez as guidance.
73
Ultimately the Ward Court found the provisions of the act were more
analogous to traditional civil damages and held accordingly. In reaching its
determination, the Court had the benefit of "overwhelming evidence that
Congress intended to create a penalty civil in all respects and quite weak
evidence of any countervailing punitive purpose or effect.1 7 4
Thus conceived, the Mendoza-Martinez-Ward test initially contemplates
whether, in establishing a particular sanction, the legislature has either ex-
pressly or impliedly indicated its intent for the scheme to be remedial and civil
or punitive. 75 The Ohio ALS/OMVI statutory scheme does not explicitly set
forth the intent of the General Assembly at the time of enactment. Ohio does
not record its legislative history so there is no record of the policy consider-
168. Id. at 169.
169. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
170. Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 249.
172. Id. In both Ward and Mendoza-Martinez, the Court had the benefit of express
manifestations of congressional intent. In Mendoza-Martinez, a detailed comparison, between
the statutory scheme and the tests traditionally applied to determine whether an act is penal
or regulatory, was deemed "unnecessary, because the objective manifestations of congressional
purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question can only be interpreted as
punitive." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) (emphasis added).
173. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
174. Id. at 254.
175. Id. at 248.
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ations taken into account by the General Assembly during enactment. The
ALS itself is silent concerning whether the civil rules of procedure apply or
whether the criminal rules of procedure apply to ALS hearings. Therefore,
"absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of
a statute, [the] factors [in Kennedy v. Mendoza -Martinez] must be considered
in relation to the statute on its face."'
1 7 6
(1) Whether the ALS involves an affirmative disability or restraint
"Once licenses are issued ... their continued possession may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.' 7I 7 Therefore, a person cannot be
deprived of this "substantial"17 1 property interest without satisfying the pro-
cedural requirements of the due process guarantee in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 179 When a driver's license is improperly revoked, a licensee can never
be made whole for the personal inconvenience and economic hardship suf-
fered as a result. 8 ° The imposition of the ALS, at the time of arrest, is "swift
and sure,"'' and courts are precluded, for a substantial period of time, from
providing even limited driving privileges based on hardship.
8 2
When the ALS is imposed, it effectively works a partial forfeiture of the
motorist's economic rights by severely restricting the motorist's ability to
earn a living and carry on normal day-to-day activities. 3 Although the ALS
176. Mendoza -Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. In State v. Casalicchio, the Ohio Supreme Court
adopted the rationale and factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 569 N.E.2d
916, 920 (Ohio 1991) (forfeiture of contraband which required a criminal conviction was
intended as a penalty for the underlying felony and barred by double jeopardy).
In State v. Strong, the Supreme Court of Vermont adopted the factors in Mendoza-Martinez
in determining that the ALS did not constitute punishment which would bar a subsequent trial
for OMVI. 605 A.2d 510 (Ver. 1992). Like Ohio, the Vermont version provided for an ALS
at the time of arrest. However, a motorist could avoid the immediate suspension by requesting
a hearing on whether the procedural prerequisites of the ALS were properly met. The State
had the burden of proving the statutory requirements for the suspension by a preponderance
of the evidence. Once met, the suspension commenced for 90 days, during which period the
motorist had to participate in alcohol screening and therapy, or education requirements if
needed.
177. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
178. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
179. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
180. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11; Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113.
181. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SWIFT AND SURE (1993) (pamphlet describing Ohio's
ALS/OMVI statutory scheme).
182. 15 days for first-time arrestee failure; 30 days for first-time arrestee refusal.
183. Cf Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). In Austin, the Supreme Court
defined a "forfeiture" as "an economic penalty," id. at 2810, which serves not only remedial
purposes, but also "either retributive or deterrent purposes." Id. at 2806. In refining the
concept of punishment as it relates to civil, economic penalties, the Court rejected the
government's argument that the decisive difference between forfeiture -proceedings and the
concept of punishment is that the typical civil proceeding is designed principally to serve
remedial purposes.
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does constitute the "revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted," 84 an ALS
nonetheless unquestionably results in a substantial disability and restraint for
the motorist.
(2) Whether the ALS has historically been regarded as a punishment
Historically, Ohio's ALS has been considered civil and administra-
tive.185 Although the ALS had punitive aspects, 86 the ALS was not closely
connected to the prosecution of a criminal case. Further, the ALS provided
both significant judicial review prior to its imposition, and immediate occu-
pational driving privileges after its imposition.
In the due process context, the United States Supreme Court has been
willing to characterize the ALS of sister states as primarily remedial. In
determining what process was required in order to constitutionally seize a
driver's license, the Court, in Dixon v. Love 8 7 and Mackey v. Montrym, 18  held
that the important public interest in safety on the roads and highways trumped
a driver's substantial interest in a pre-seizure deprivation hearing. However,
in the same breath, the Court also characterized the ALS as a penalty.189
Ohio's present ALS has punitive aspects far exceeding the schemes
discussed in Dixon and Mackey. There is no availability of hardship driving
privileges, nor is there a guarantee of a prompt, post-seizure deprivation
hearing. For the first-time arrestee, if a continuance is requested by the pros-
ecution or the court at the initial appearance, the burdensome period of abso-
lute suspension will generally have expired prior to a hearing. 90
Hence, the historical background of Ohio's ALS as a remedial sanction
is only of marginal relevance in determining the present character of Ohio's
ALS. Historically, and generally, license suspensions, like fines and confine-
ments, can be characterized as either punitive or remedial. The appropriate
184. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). See also State v. Elfrink, No. 95
APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995).
185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
186. See Bender, supra note 19, at 121. "Since there is no practical way to arrest every
DWI offender or even a significant percentage, the only effective method to generally deter
this mass antisocial conduct is to instill in the public the perception of deterrence. The most
effective deterrent penalty in DWI enforcement is license suspension. Therefore, if every
arrested offender suffers some form of immediate license suspension without the complicated
time-consuming procedures of the criminal justice system, the public perception of deterrence
will be increased." Id.
187. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
188. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
189. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) ("Such a penalty for refusing to
take a blood alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural
protections.").
190. Davis, supra note 7, at 702.
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designation is dependent upon the purpose for which the sanction is employed
and the method and severity of its application. 9' As increasingly punitive
provisions to Ohio's ALS are enacted, reliance on past history becomes in-
creasingly tenuous."'
Although the ALS has been traditionally characterized as civil and ad-
ministrative, a "refusal" ALS is more in the nature of a penalty for declining
to produce potentially incriminating evidence than a remedy for dangerous
driving. This is because states want motorists "to choose to take the test, for
the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far
stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test."'193 The punitive
aspect of a "refusal" ALS in Ohio is obvious when compared to a "failure."
Unlike a "failure," a "refusal" suspension is not terminated unless the defen-
dant pleads no contest or guilty. Those motorists who fail the test, and pro-
duce reliable, scientific evidence of the commission of a crime, are treated
with more leniency than motorists where, because of the refusal itself, proof
of an OMVI crime is more problematic. Thus, the "refusal" defendant is more
likely to be found innocent of the charge, and presumably less of a risk to
public safety than those who are actually guilty of OMVI, but is still subject
to the one year ALS suspension. This suspension can only be described as a
penalty for refusing to take a requested test to determine alcohol content.
Ohio's ALS has never been justified as "remedial" in the sense that the
suspension would improve the motorist's ability to operate a motor vehicle in
the future.' 94 If the ALS does serve to improve poor driving habits, it can
probably be attributed to the fear of a future suspension. Such an improve-
ment results from deterrence, and thus punishment, rather than from some
general remedial purpose.
195
191. For instance, confinement is utilized in many non-punitive ways, such as confinement
for pretrial detainees, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979), holding aliens awaiting detention, see Marcelo v. Bounds, 349
U.S. 302 (1955), and involuntary mental confinees. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
364-65 (1983).
By the same token, the absence of potential imprisonment does not prove a sanction is non-
criminal, as evidenced in Halper and Kurth Ranch. In some circumstances, a large fine may
effect a more severe hardship than a short imprisonment.
192. State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. App. 1995) (Crippen, J., concurring)
("License revocation has always had characteristics of punishment, and a continuing series of
amendments make it evident that this purpose is expanding.").
193. Neville, 459 U.S. at 564.
194. The Ohio ALS is also not remedial in the Halper sense of compensating injured parties
for a tangible loss, or reimbursing government for the costs incurred in investigation and
prosecution. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989).
195. J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 481-487 (1976). See also Hanson, 532 N.W.2d
at 604 (Randall, J., concurring). Judge Randall concluded that Minnesota's ALS constituted
punishment, although not yet excessive punishment. He explained:
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(3) Whether the ALS comes into play only on a finding of scienter
The Ohio Supreme Court has characterized Ohio's "per se" OMVI stat-
ute as a strict liability offense. 196 The "under the influence" division of the
statute can also be considered a strict liability offense in the sense that an
actor's culpability in attaining the state of impairment is irrelevant-as long
as the impairment was voluntary. 9' The prosecution does not have to prove
a culpable mental state. Initially, it would seem at first that an ALS is like-
wise triggered without a finding of scienter. All that appears to be required
is a test over the "per se" level. Even a refusal to take a test need not be know-
ingly or intelligently made.'98 The implementation of a "refusal," without re-
quiring an understanding of the nature of the proceedings, has been described
as "harsh," but to hold otherwise would present an opportunity for drivers to
argue that they were too intoxicated to knowingly refuse and, thus, escape the
penal aspect of the statute.' 99
Although a "refusal" ALS does not require the degree of scienter nor-
[W]e are getting close to the breaking point... [O]ur dual system [is] creaking at its
joints from the strain. I conclude the mantra of the state, that implied consent is
remedial and therefore not double punishment, has to be disregarded if we are to
remain honest with our citizens. In truth, the so-called remedial sanctions do their
job of 'remediating' by punishing drivers. The history behind the legislative
enactments, the rhetoric from citizens concerned about drunk driving, and from the
law enforcement agencies charged with guarding our roads make it clear that the
civil penalties were imposed and then ratcheted up to teach drivers that if you drive
intoxicated (or .10), you will be punished, to teach you a lesson not to do it again,
and we want that lesson to be spread to other drivers. This is not to say that those
who drive under the influence should not be punished for what they have done and
to send a message to others, but this is to say that if the remediation were not
punishment, its lessons would not stick. This is all too well known to the designers
of the civil implied consent statutes, and to the designers of the unbroken string of
enhancements of implied consent punishment the last decade.
Id.
196. State v. Tanner, 472 N.E.2d 689, 692 n.4 (Ohio 1984).
197. In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the Court ultimately determined that
the civil sanctions of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act were not sufficiently punitive
to trigger the protections afforded by the Constitution to a criminal defendant. Criminal
penalties under the Act were for the precise conduct penalized in the civil scheme. In reaching
its determination, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to imply that strict liability sanctions are
indicative of a punitive scheme, although logically, the opposite conclusion would seem more
likely to comport with Mendoza-Martinez. The Chief Justice noted: "respondent points out
that at least one federal court has held [the act is] a 'strict liability crime,' for which there is
no scienter .... [T]his consideration seems to point toward a finding that § 311(b)(6) is
criminal in nature." Id. at 250. This conclusion was strongly disputed in Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, wherein he notes that, unlike the statutory scheme in Ward, when scienter
is present in a statute, it "might be indicative of a criminal proceeding." Id. at 256 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
198. Hoban v. Rice, 267 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ohio 1971); Schotter v. McCullion, 578 N.E.2d
838, 840 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Anderson v. McCullion, No. 3411, 1989 WL 11506 (Ohio Ct.
App., 5th Dist., Jan. 19, 1989), appeal dismissed, 539 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio 1989).
199. PAINTER AND LOOKER, supra note 16, at § 7.23.
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mally associated with criminal statutes, some degree of culpability is appar-
ent. Ohio's ALS/OMVI laws bear a much greater resemblance to statutes pe-
nalizing recklessness than strict liability offenses. The effects of alcohol are
well-known, and information is readily accessible to the public showing the
correlation between alcohol consumption and the hazards of operating a motor
vehicle. 20 1 When an individual drinks and drives, he runs the risk that his
blood alcohol content (BAC) may exceed the "per se" level, 20' and, depend-
ing on the harm caused by the driving, that he may be subject to a variety of
criminal charges in addition to OMVI.
2°2
(4) Whether the ALS' operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment - retribution and deterrence
There is no legislative history in Ohio, and the statutory scheme is silent
as to the purpose of the ALS. However, the ALS, in its present form, is the
result of federal legislation which provided federal highway funding to the
states in return for the states adopting various provisions, including the ALS,
in their OMVI statutory schemes. The legislative history surrounding these
200. The commentary to § 2.08 of the Model Penal Code notes:
[T]he potential consequences of excessive drinking ... [are] by now so dispersed in
our culture that it is not unfair to postulate a general equivalence between the risks
created by the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in
becoming drunk. Becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor's powers
of perception and judgment is conduct that plainly has no affirmative social value to
counterbalance the potential danger. The actor's moral culpability lies in engaging
in such conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, commentary at 357-359 (1985).
201. State v. Tanner, 472 N.E.2d 689, 691-92 (Ohio 1984). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.22 (Baldwin 1994). Division (C), entitled Culpable Mental States, provides:
[a] person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he
perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result
or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances
when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a
known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
§ 2901.22(C). "Risk" is defined as "a significant possibility, as contrasted with a remote
possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(G) (Baldwin 1994).
At a minimum, the motorist, by testing over the "per se" level, has acted in a criminally
negligent manner "when, because of a substantial lapse of due care, he fails to perceive or
avoid a risk that this conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(D) (Baldwin 1994).
202. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.06(A) (Baldwin 1994) (providing that no person,
while operating a motor vehicle, shall recklessly cause the death of another). Division (B)
provides that if a person tests over the "per se" limit, the "offender shall be presumed to have
been under the influence of alcohol." § 2903.06(B). See also § 2903.04(B) ("No person shall
cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to
commit a misdemeanor.").
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federal statutes clearly portrays the ALS as substantially motivated by the
twin penal concerns of deterrence and retribution.
Two federal statutes enumerate conditions to be met by states in order
to receive federal funding for highways. The first applicable statute is 23
U.S.C. § 408. This statute provides that "the Secretary shall make grants to
those states which adopt and implement effective programs to reduce traffic
safety problems resulting from persons driving while under the influence of
alcohol or a controlled substance. ' 20 3 Section 408 authorizes a basic grant for
any state adopting alcohol traffic safety programs that mandate the "prompt
suspension.., of the driver's license of any individual who a law enforcement
officer has probable cause . . . to believe has committed an alcohol-related
traffic offense. ' 204 This suspension is enacted if an individual is either deter-
mined to be intoxicated after a chemical test is performed, or if the suspected
individual refuses to submit to a chemical test.2 5 Under these circumstances,
the license suspension is effective for not less than ninety days.
206
This statute was designed to encourage states to design and implement
programs to reduce alcohol-related traffic accidents and deaths. State com-
pliance was meant to be voluntary rather than mandatory.2 7 Thus, the goal of
improving highway safety could be accomplished by preventing alcohol-re-
lated accidents, without dictating policy that would interfere with the domain
of the states.
208
However, the congressional history of § 408 indicates that improving
highway safety was not the only goal to be accomplished by this legislation.
In fact, in the House of Representatives, deterrence and punishment were
motivating factors behind enacting this legislation. 20 9 These same attitudes
203. 23 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994).
204. 23 U.S.C. § 408(e)(1)(A) (1994).
205. 23 U.S.C. § 408(e)(l)(A)(i),(ii) (1994).
206. 23 U.S.C. § 408(e)(3)(A) (1994).
207. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3367.
208. Id.
209. 128 CONG. REC. 25,966 (1982) (statement of Mr. Howard) ("[The bill] addresses all
of the vital concerns of the law enforcement community .... [T]he main aim of the bill is
deterrence [and] [p]unishment is justified after the fact."); 128 CONG. REC. 25,968 (1982)
(statement of Mr. Young) (Federal funds will deter drunk driving by utilizing "swift and sure
arrest, conviction, punishment, and rehabilitation of the offender."); 182 CONG. REC. 25,970
(1982) (statement of Mr. Evans) ("The bill ... will provide seed money to encourage States
to adopt effective plans that will really crack down on drunk driving ... includ[ing] prompt
suspension of driving licenses [and] mandatory jail or community service sentences[.]"); 128
CONG. REC. 28,971 (1982) (statement of Mr. Ratchford) (states will be encouraged to "punish
and rehabilitate drunk drivers."). See 128 CONG. REC. 25,970 (1982) (statement of Mr.
Oberstar) ("The key factor in deterring drunk driving is the level of enforcement and the
driver's perception that he will be apprehended."). See also 128 CONG. REC. 25,971 (1982)
(statement of Mr. Fary) ("We should ... encourage all States to strictly enforce their drunk
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were present in the Senate. The deterrent effect of an administrative license
suspension was emphasized, and it was noted that this penalty should not be
implemented after lengthy court proceedings.210 Thus, the intent of the leg-
islation was not solely to improve safety by reducing the likelihood that drunk
drivers would cause injury and death on the nation's highways. The congres-
sional intent also illustrates that the federal funding was a financial incentive
to induce states to deter and punish drunk drivers.
The legislative history surrounding the amendments to this statute does
not indicate that punishment was the main goal motivating the changes in this
alcohol-traffic safety provision. However, it cannot be disputed that the leg-
islators were aware of the punitive purpose behind the original provision. For
example, when the Senate debated H.R. 4616, which was later adopted to
amend 23 U.S.C. § 408, the intent of the original legislation was echoed on the
floor. One senator noted that "in 1982 we enacted Public Law 97-364... to
prevent, detect, and punish drunk driving."2 1 Thus, the legislative history of
the 1984 amendment to 23 U.S.C. § 408 indicates an awareness on the part of
the legislators to carry out the original punitive purposes of this legislation.
The second statute relating to whether the legislative history of federal
highway funding programs indicates an intent to punish drunk drivers is 23
U.S.C. § 410. This statute provides federal funding to states that adopt five
or more of the six recommended options to reduce alcohol-related incidents.
212
One of these options is to suspend the license of an individual who is deter-
mined to be driving under the influence of alcohol. 2 3 The legislative history
illustrates that this section seeks to expand on section 408, because the empha-
sis on deterring drunk driving is present.21 4 However, the history surround-
ing this statute and its corresponding amendments lacks any direct statements
driving laws ... so drunk drivers will be punished and kept off the highways. It is my hope
that this legislation will help us reach this goal.").
210. 128 CONG. REC. 26,949 (1982) (statement of Mr. Danforth) ("Historically, license
revocation has been treated as a discretionary criminal sanction. This bill, however, recognizes
that license revocation is a highly effective deterrent against drunk driving that should not be
used exclusively as a criminal penalty imposed only after lengthy court proceedings."). See
generally Eric Pianin, Bill Urges Suspending Drunk Drivers' Licenses; Federal Highway
Trust Funds Would be Offered as Incentive, WASH. POST, May 12, 1988, at B4. Rather, the
bill was designed to increase the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol. 128
CONG. REC. 26,950 (1982) (statement of Mr. Pell) (the legislation "provides incentives for
the State to increase penalties[.]"). See 128 CONG. REC. 26,950 (1982) (statement of Mr.
Dole) ("[W]e must encourage tough State laws that treat the drinking driver like the dangerous
criminal that he is ... [and] encourage State laws that threaten severe punishment for drunk
drivers[.]").
211. 130 CONG. REC. 18,657 (1984) (statement of Mr. Mathias).
212. 23 U.S.C. § 410(d) (1994).
213. 23 U.S.C. § 410(d)(1)(A) (1994).
214. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1561, 1564.
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that indicate an intent to use an ALS as punishment for drunk driving.
However, one excerpt persuasively supports the view that an ALS, pur-
suant to 23 U.S.C. § 410, is a method of punishment. The statute was origi-
nally introduced as part of H.R. 5210, which was entitled the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988.215 This Act addressed a wide-range of issues, including an
amendment to the Assimilative Crimes Act.2 6 Although the alcohol-traffic
safety provisions appear to be unrelated to the Assimilative Crimes Act
amendment, one possible relation can be inferred from the statements of
Senator Hatch.
217
Senator Hatch explained that the Assimilative Crimes Act "authorized
Federal judges to apply State criminal statutes for acts... taking place within
[a] state but on federal property. '' 218 However, the Senator criticized the Act
for having a loophole which prevented federal judges from imposing non-jail
sanctions, such as license suspensions, because the non-jail sanctions were not
viewed as punishment. 2 9 Mr. Hatch supported the Assimilative Crimes Act
amendment because the Amendment changed this interpretation and allowed
state-enacted sanctions to be defined as punishments.
20
The legislative history supports the conclusion that an ALS is a method
of punishment for alcohol-related traffic offenses. The Assimilative Crimes
Act was changed to state "that which may or shall be imposed through judi-
cial or administrative action under the law of a State ... for a conviction for
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol, shall be
considered to be a punishment provided by that law."' 22' The statements of
Senator Hatch expand on this statutory language, because he recognized and
supported the use of non-jail sanctions as punishments. Although this legis-
lative history does not directly apply to the provisions of section 410, the
important point is that a state-administered license suspension was interpreted
at the federal level as punishment. Thus, this legislative history argues per-
suasively for the proposition that administrative license suspensions, as
mandated by the federal alcohol-impaired countermeasures in 23 U.S.C. §
410, should be viewed as a form of punishment.
In summary, the legislative history of 23 U.S.C. § 408 clearly shows that
an ALS was intended to be a punishment for drunk driving. The legislative
history of 23 U.S.C. § 410 further supports this conclusion, and illustrates the
215. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4087, 4181.
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
217. See 134 CONG. REC. 15,951, 15,980-83 (1988).
218. Id. at 15982.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
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willingness of federal legislators to address the problem of drunk driving on
the nation's highways. It indicates that although the statutes were designed
to accomplish many goals, one of the intended goals was to deter and punish
drunk drivers.2
(5) Whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime
An ALS triggered by a "failure" mirrors the "per se" OMVI offenses in
Ohio. For a first-time arrestee, the ALS results in a 90 day license suspension
with no occupational driving privileges for fifteen days. The sanction is the
same for both the first-time arrestee who tests marginally over the "per se"
limit and the first-time arrestee involved in a serious accident who fails a
breath test miserably.
222. In State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL 243352 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Apr. 20,
1995), the court was persuaded that the ALS constituted, in part, punishment, as evidenced
by Connecticut's legislative history which clearly characterized the ALS as a "severe penalty,"
"swift and sure," and an "effective deterrent." Id. at *5. Moreover, the decision quoted from
a statement by a representative of the National Transportation Safety Board before the House
Judiciary Committee on February 15, 1989, wherein the representative stated that the ALS is
"viewed by drivers as a severe sanction" which "goes into effect shortly after arrest" and a
"less costly sanction for society than other countermeasures such as jail sentences." Id.
Thus, "the licenses of dangerous drivers are revoked more quickly, and the certainty of
receiving a penalty for drunk driving is dramatically increased." Id. See also Johnson v.
State, 622 A.2d 199, 204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 606
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (Crippen, J., concurring) (referenced the administrator's testimony
before the legislature that the [15 day period of unconditional license suspension] would
make sure violators suffered a deterrent.").
In Florida, the legislative history of its ALS/OMVI statutory scheme states that the ALS
was designed to "prevent, punish and discourage criminal behavior." FLORIDA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT ON CH. 89-525 (Laws of Florida, June 13, 1989).
After Ohio's enactment of its 1993 amendments to R.C. § 4511.191, the Ohio Department
of Highway Safety distributed a brochure to the public entitled, "Swift and Sure." The brochure
announces that, "IF YOU DRINK AND DRIVE, YOU ARE COMMITTING A SERIOUS
CRIME WHICH HAS SWIFT AND SURE CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE HARD TO
IGNORE." The brochure goes on to state:
Beginning September 1, 1993, sweeping reforms of Ohio's drunk driving laws will
go into effect which will make it tough for drivers who make the wrong decision to
drink and get behind the wheel of a motor vehicle.
NEW
Administrative
License Suspension
(ALS)
If you are stopped for drunk driving and you refuse to take the sobriety test or if
your test results exceed the legal limit of .10% Blood Alcohol Concentration BAC
the officer can take your driver's license on the spot and the suspension begins
immediately .... The administrative license suspension is independent of any jail
term, fine or other criminal penalty imposed in court for a DUI offense.
SWIFT AND SURE, supra note 181.
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An ALS as a consequence of a refusal, although not a crime, does result
in both civil and criminal sanctions. A "refusal" results in a one year driving
rights suspension, with no occupational driving privileges available for 30
days.2 23 In addition, evidence of a refusal is admissible in the "under the in-
fluence" case to prove guilt. 224 The prosecution's use of "refusal" evidence
has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, in South Dakota v.
Neville,225 as not infringing on a motorist's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 226 Currently, at least five jurisdictions have gone beyond
223. The length of both the refusal suspension and the period without any hardship driving
privileges increases significantly if the motorist has a prior history of refusing requested
chemical tests. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (E)(1)(a)-(d) (Baldwin 1994).
224. The Ohio Supreme Court has approved of the following jury instruction for OMVI
cases involving a refusal:
Evidence has been introduced indicating the defendant was asked but refused to
submit to a chemical test of his [or her] breath to determine the amount of alcohol in
his [or her] system, for the purpose of suggesting that the defendant believed he [or
she] was under the influence of alcohol. If you find the defendant refused to submit
to said test, you may, but are not required to, consider this evidence along with all
the other facts and circumstances in evidence in deciding whether the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol.
City of Maumee v. Anistik, 632 N.E.2d 497 (Ohio 1994); 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS §
545.25(10) (1993). See also City of Columbus v. Mullins, 123 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 1954).
The Court in Anistek relied on South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), in determining
that refusal evidence is admissible in a prosecution for OMVI. See infra note 227. The
overwhelming majority of states permit a prosecutor to comment on a motorist's refusal to
take a chemical test. See Howard S. Cohen, Note, Evidence of Refusal to Submit to Chemical
Breath Test for Alcohol Admissible Only When Relevant to Matters Other than Defendant's
Innocence or Guilt, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 115, 123 n.49 (1992).
Some states hold evidence of a refusal inadmissible either by statute or case law. HAW.
REV. STAT. § 286-159 (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(e) (West Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.10 (Michie Supp. 1992); Kraus v. State, 587 A.2d 1102,
1105 (Md. 1991); People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). These
statutes and cases are discussed in Cohen, supra.
225. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
226. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that the state could
compel the withdrawal of blood for alcohol analysis, and introduce the results of the analysis
into evidence, without violating the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment was limited to
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment did not
require exclusion of the "body as evidence when it may be material." See Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910). As a result, "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused
the source of 'real or physical' evidence does not violate" the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 764.
Schmerber reserved the question of whether evidence of a refusal to submit to a test for
alcohol content violates the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 765 n.9. However, in South Dakota v.
Neville, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit a prosecutor from
commenting at trial on a motorist's refusal to take a requested test for alcohol content,
notwithstanding that a refusal may be "a tacit or overt expression and communication of the
defendant's thoughts." 459 U.S. at 560 (1983). According to the Court, "[a] refusal to take a
blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the
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Neville, and actually criminalized the refusal to take requested chemical
tests.227 Some of these states provide that the penalties for refusing to take a
chemical test are identical to the OMVI offense.
2 28
The Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission ("OCSC") is currently de-
bating whether to criminalize the refusal to take a requested chemical test and
to provide penalties co-extensive with the penalties for OMVI. 229 The impe-
tus for this debate has been the extremely high rate of refusals in some coun-
ties in Ohio - as high as 50-60%.230 An alternative OCSC proposal provides
that evidence of a refusal would not only be fair comment by the prosecution
in the criminal case, but would also result in a rebuttable presumption at trial
that the motorist was under the influence of alcohol.2 1 A third proposal is to
increase the civil disabilities attendant to a refusal, in an effort to increase
compliance.
232
An ALS is currently subject to severe sanctions. In the case of a "fail-
officer." Id. at 564. Since Schmerber grants states a legitimate right to compel a test for
alcohol, it is "no less legitimate when the state offers a second option of refusing the test,
with the attendant penalties for making that choice." Id. at 563.
Since a state may compel a motorist to submit to a test to determine alcohol content,
statutes criminalizing the refusal to submit to such tests have been upheld as not violative of
the Fifth Amendment. McCracken v. State, 695 P.2d 1275, 1281 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984);
McDonnell v. C6-90-53 Commr. of Pub. Safety, 460 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn. 1990); State v.
Manley, 202 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1972).
For a critical analysis of the Court's rationale in Neville, see generally, H. Richard Ulliver,
Self-Incrimination by Inference: Constitutional Restrictions on the Evidentiary Use of a
Suspect's Refusal to Submit to a Search, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 37 (1990) (arguing
that the use in a criminal prosecution of the adverse inference that refusal was motivated by a
guilty conscience is unconstitutional).
227. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. § 169.121 (1994);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-4, 164 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1994).
228. See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 667 P.2d 188 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
229. Minutes, Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, October 26, 1995. For example, a
proposed amendment to the implied consent law, R.C. § 4511.191, would provide:
(A)(3) The refusal to take a chemical test would be a misdemeanor of the first degree.
Working Papers of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, R.C. § 4511.191.
230. Minutes, Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, October 26, 1995 (statements of
Capt. Morckel, Ohio State Highway Patrol Representative).
231. For example, a proposed amendment to the implied consent law, R.C. § 4511.191,
would provide:
(A)(3) No person has the right to refuse the test designated by the law enforcement
agency. If the person refuses the designated test, it is a rebuttable presumption that
the person was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol or a drug
of abuse.
Working Papers of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, R.C. § 4511.191.
232. Minutes, Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, October 26, 1995 (statements of
Max Kravitz, Ohio State Bar Association Representative).
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ure," the identical conduct constitutes a criminal offense. In the case of a
"refusal," the implied consent law currently suspends driving rights for a sig-
nificant length of time, and establishes an adverse inference at the criminal
trial. It is likely that the sanctions for a "refusal" will be increased signifi-
cantly in the future. Against this backdrop, it is clear that an ALS is identi-
cal to, or closely associated with, criminal activity.
(6) Whether there is an alternative purpose to which the ALS may be
rationally connected
The remedial purpose underlying the ALS is obvious-reduce deaths on
the highways as a result of the impaired motorist "which occurs with tragic
frequency. ' 233 This purpose is well-documented, and has been the subject of
comment in numerous Supreme Court decisions.234 However, to characterize
the ALS as "remedial" because one of the purposes of the legislation is to
improve highway traffic safety ignores the manner in which the ALS imple-
ments the remedy. It provides a "swift and sure 2 35 "penalty 236 to potential
lawbreakers without a hearing, and without an individualized consideration
of whether the motorist is a future threat to public safety.237
233. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983).
234. Id. Neville referenced numerous earlier Court decisions expressing the same concern.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1979) (recognizing the "compelling interest in highway
safety"); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The
slaughter on the highways on this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars"); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 295, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (deploring "traffic irresponsibility
and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways"); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,
439 (1957) ("The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable,
now reaches the astounding figures only heard on the battlefied."). See also Doyle v. Ohio
Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 554 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1990).
235. SWIFT AND SURE, supra note 181.
236. Neville, 459 U.S. at 560.
237. The TECHNICAL HANDBOOK ON OHIO'S NEW DUI LAWS explains the ALS as follows:
Ohio's new OMVI laws (Sub.S.B. 275 and Sub. S.B. 62), which take effect September
1. 1993, will be SWIFT and SURE. The basis is simple enough: if you drink and
drive in Ohio, you'll automatically lose your license. The Ohio Department of
Public Safety has produced this handbook to help you understand the various aspects
of these laws.
As law enforcement officers, the courts, and the Department of Public Safety begin
to enforce the stiffest penalties ever for impaired driving in the State of Ohio, we
know they will have a major impact on reducing deaths and injuries on our highways
because the penalties will be SWIFT and SURE.
Ohio's new laws are the toughest yet on drunk drivers and removes them from our
roadways. In fact, for multiple OMVI offenders and those driving under an OMVI
or FRA suspension, it's the end of the road. To this end, I hope you'll find this
handbook helpful.
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The temporary nature of an ALS undermines its stated "remedial" pur-
pose. A license to drive will revert back to the motorist regardless of whether
the motorist is a threat to public safety.238 The fact that a motorist may be a
threat to future public safety is beyond the scope of the ALS hearing, since the
hearing is only concerned with whether various procedural prerequisites have
been met. Moreover, occupational driving privileges may be granted solely
on the basis that an ALS would be a hardship. The statute does not require the
court to determine if the interest of future public safety would outweigh the
motorist's interest in occupational privileges.
If statistical evidence exists that a motorist becomes a safer driver as a
result of the imposition of the ALS, the reason for this is probably the fear of
future punishment, because there is no remediation required of the motorist
in the statute. In this sense, the ALS operates as remedial in the manner that
all criminal laws are remedial. Criminal laws are designed to prevent conduct
which inflicts or threatens substantial harm, to punish and hopefully, to reha-
bilitate.239
(7) Whether the ALS appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned
The decisions finding the ALS remedial rely on numerous decisions
holding that the ALS is designed to remove from the highways drivers that are
a danger to the public.24° However, the statutory scheme is both arbitrary and
excessive. At the same time, it is insufficient to accomplish its professed
remedial objectives.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, TECHNICAL HANDBOOK ON OHIO'S NEW DUI LAWS
(1993) (comments of Director Charles D. Shipley) (emphasis in original).
238. Cf Clark, supra note 195, at 483 n.315 (implying that the willingness to release a
criminal without proof of rehabilitation belies rehabilitation as the justifying aim of
confinement and indicates retribution or deterrence instead).
Vermont, for example, mandates alcohol screening, as well as education and therapy
requirements if needed, before a license is returned pursuant to an ALS. State v. Strong, 605
A.2d 510, 515 (1992).
239. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02.
240. City of Whitehall v. Weese, No. 95 APC02-169, 1995 WL 614139 (Ohio Ct. App.,
10th Dist., Oct. 17, 1995); State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350 (Ohio Ct.
App., 10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995); State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct.
App., 12th Dist., Aug. 21, 1995); State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL 275770 (Ohio Ct.
App., 3d Dist., May 12), appeal granted, 655 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995); State v. Harrison, 654
N.E.2d 210 (Ohio C.P. 1995); State v. Toriello, 654 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995);
State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646
N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995).
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The ALS exceeds what is necessary for remediation.2 41 It is equally
applicable to all first-time arrestees without regard to prior driving record, the
degree of intoxication, the need for treatment or the actual harm caused by the
driving. If the ALS were truly related to highway safety, the length and con-
ditions of a license suspension, as well as the opportunity for occupational
driving privileges, would be tailored to the circumstances of the individual
and the alleged offense, rather than being applied mechanically and identi-
cally to all arrestees.
242
Although the ALS purports to be concerned with public safety, the sus-
pension period often terminates prior to the completion of the criminal case.
A driver who is a danger to the community can obtain full driving privileges
prior to a court making an individualized determination that the defendant is
not a risk to public safety. Moreover, after the absolute period of suspension
has expired, the ALS provides for occupational driving privileges, without
regard to public safety, if the ALS "would seriously affect the person's abil-
ity to continue in his employment.
'2 43
The punitive nature of the ALS is clearly revealed when it is compared
to other provisions in the 1993 legislation that provide for remedial interven-
tion. In 1993, the General Assembly enacted Revised Code § 4511.196(B),
244
which permits judges, at the motorist's initial appearance, to make a discre-
tionary determination whether the motorist's "continued driving will be a
241. It has been suggested that whenever a deterring sanction goes beyond what is strictly
necessary to disable the actor from future undesirable conduct, the sanction should be regarded
as criminal for all constitutional purposes. Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 507-14 (1974).
242. See Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350, at *10 (Bowman, J., dissenting). In addition, a $250.00
reinstatement fee must be paid-an amount 40 times the actual cost ($6.25) of issuing a new
license. This fee is not related to compensating the governmental entity for any loss and has
been characterized as a "fine," rather than a remedial sanction, by the Solicitor General of
Ohio. Manning v. City of Columbus, No. C-2-95-613 & n.2, (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Memorandum
and Order, Dec. 20, 1995) (Holschuh, J., presiding).
In State v. Jerry Packman, the court overruled the defendants's double jeopardy claim but
held that the defendant had previously been punished by having to pay a $250.00 reinstatement
fee which bears no rational relationship to the remedial aspects of the statute. No. 95 TRC
473, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Mun. Ct. March 31, 1995). In City of Seven Hills v. Adkins, the court
opined:
It is clear that not one cent of the Reinstatement Fee is allocated toward the cost to
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of reinstating a driver's license, but is nothing more
than a "fine," which is allocated to five different purposes of the Government of the
State of Ohio. There is no question that the "Reinstatement Fee" is in fact not a
reinstatement fee, but a $250.00 fine, which is allocated to various sources.
No. 95 TRC 1093, 1995 WL 699671, at *7 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Aug. 7, 1995).
243. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(I)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
244. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196(B) (Baldwin 1994).
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threat to public safety."24 5 This "public safety" suspension continues until the
complaint on the charge resulting from the arrest is adjudicated on the mer-
its. 246 By making public safety the criterion for a license suspension under §
45 11.196, a factor that is notably absent from consideration in the ALS, the
General Assembly has created a truly remedial statute that affords a motor-
ist an immediate hearing on the only issue that provides justification for a
preconviction suspension in the first place. The ALS, which focuses mechani-
cally on a "failure" or a "refusal", without consideration for future public
safety, and which penalizes all drivers regardless of potential for future harm,
can only be considered excessive, and thus punitive, when measured against
the "public safety" statute.
247
The factors delineated in Mendoza -Martinez all point to the conclusion
that the ALS is punishment, and courts "should follow the notion where it
leads. ' 248 The features of Ohio's ALS are the result of a coordinated effort to
promote highway safety by providing a "swift and sure" penalty prior to con-
viction. The imposition of this penalty deserves protection from further pros-
ecution. If the General Assembly desires to implement an ALS that is true to
its stated remedial purpose, it certainly has the ability to do so, and contem-
poraneously protect public safety. 249 Until that time, the infliction of the ALS
will probably lead to thousands of OMVI prosecutions that are either dis-
missed or delayed indefinitely as the cases are appealed through Ohio and
federal courts.
B. Does the ALS Involve a Separate Proceeding?
Most Ohio courts that have examined the ALS/OMVI statutory scheme
have held that the imposition of the ALS takes place at a separate proceeding
245. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196 (Baldwin 1994). The statute provides:
(B)(1) If a person is arrested . . .and if the judge . . .at the initial appearance
terminates the suspension ... the judge, referee, or mayor at the initial appearance
may impose a new suspension of the person's license, permit, or nonresident operating
privilege, notwithstanding the termination of the [ALS], if the judge, referee, or
mayor determines at the initial appearance that the person's continued driving will
be a threat to public safety.
Id. Thus, the public safety suspension can only be imposed if the ALS is terminated.
Otherwise, a court is precluded from utilizing this statute.
246. Like the ALS, the suspension period is credited towards any suspension imposed at
the end of the case.
247. No Ohio court has considered the availability and nature of R.C. § 4511.196 when
considering whether the ALS is punitive or remedial.
248. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
249. See discussion regarding stays, infra at Part V.
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from the OMVI charge(s).5 0 However, three courts25 ' argue that the ALS and
OMVI take place in a "single, coordinated prosecution. ' 25 2 One court has
questioned whether the imposition of the ALS, effected summarily at the time
of arrest, can even be characterized as a proceeding at all.
2 53
250. City of Whitehall v. Weese, No. 95 APC02-169, 1995 WL 614139 (Ohio Ct. App.,
10th Dist., Oct. 17, 1995); State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350 (Ohio Ct.
App., 10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995); State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct.
App., 12th Dist., Aug. 21, 1995); State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL 275770 (Ohio Ct.
App., 3d Dist., May 12), appeal granted, 655 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995); State v. Harrison, 654
N.E.2d 210 (Ohio C.P. 1995); State v. Toriello, 654 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995);
State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646
N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995).
251. State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195;
Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350.
252. See, e.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1502 (lth
Cir. 1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub noan.
Bottone v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). See discussion infra note 258.
253. State v. Beltz, 654 N.E.2d 199 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995). The court, in holding that a
refusal ALS suspension did not bar a subsequent prosecution for OMVI, noted:
It is difficult to characterize the A.L.S. as a "proceeding" at all. The sanction, loss
of driving privileges, is accomplished with the stroke of a law enforcement officer's
pen within minutes of arresting the suspected drinking driver-no notice, no hearing.
The only "proceeding" is the appeal which occurs after the fact, and during which
driving privileges remain suspended. Gone are the troublesome requirements of prior
notice and opportunity to be heard. With supreme efficiency the execution is over
before the trial begins.
Id. See also State v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18,
1995), where the court, in striking down the ALS as violative of due process, noted that "[a]n
,on the spot' suspension, by its very nature, deprives the licensee of any notice of the proposed
action ... [a]nd, an arresting officer, who is both the accuser and arbiter of the offense, can
hardly be deemed neutral and impartial."
The Beltz court tangentially raised an issue of some importance-can jeopardy attach if a
defendant acquiesces to the ALS at the time of arrest and does not contest (or appeal) the
ALS at the initial appearance? Stated another way, have the Double Jeopardy Clause concerns
as to anxiety, expense, depletion of resources, and public embarrassment by repeated attempts
to convict and punish been significantly infringed by permitting a trial on the OMVI charge
after a summary ALS that has not been contested? See, e.g., State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d
195 (1995). In Uncapher, the defendant did not contest the ALS in court. The Uncapher
court held that:
Uncapher did not avail herself of any court proceedings. The notice of the ALS was
given to her but she did not appeal. Therefore there has never been a judicial or
administrative proceeding beyond the service of notice either- of the ALS or the
DUI/PAC, excepting this motion to dismiss ...In every authority cited by the
defendant, the other proceeding involved a hearing or trial process wherein a
determination was made to impose or continue the civil sanction. If the defendant
waives such a determination and forgoes the hearing, no judicial or quasi-judicial
process has put the defendant through all the hurdles that double jeopardy is intended
to foreclose.
Id. at 14.
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"The most basic element of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the protection
it affords against successive prosecutions - that is, against efforts to impose
punishment for the same offense in two or more separate proceedings." '2 54 The
requirement of a second proceeding "is critical in triggering the protections
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 25 5 However, the Supreme Court has also
stated unequivocally that the government may seek and obtain "both the full
civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in
the same proceeding. 256
In jury trials, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38
(1978). In nonjury trials, jeopardy attaches "when the court begins to hear evidence." Serfass
v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). Jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a
plea agreement upon the court's acceptance of the plea agreement. United States v. Smith,
912 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1990). See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345,
95-346) (holding that jeopardy attaches in a nontrial forfeiture proceeding when the court
accepts the stipulation of forfeiture and enters the judgment of forfeiture). Accord United
States v. Tamez, 881 F. Supp. 460, 466 (E.D. Wash. 1995).
In United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669
(1994), Torres failed to file a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding and $60,000 was forfeited.
In denying his claim that the forfeiture triggered double jeopardy protection at a subsequent
criminal trial, the court held that as a non-party, Torres was not at risk in the forfeiture
proceeding, and "[w]ithout risk of a determination of guilty, jeopardy does not attach, and
neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy." Id. at 391-92. Accord
United States v. Cotts, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4992 (E.D. I1. 1995; United States v. Martin,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXis 3459 (N.D. Ill. 1995); United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307 (9th Cir.
1995).
But see Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 983, 986 (S.D. Cal.), on
reconsideration, 873 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Cal. 1995) ("Although in this case plaintiff did not
timely contest the forfeiture because he claims he never received notice of the impending
proceeding, the forfeiture still constituted a 'proceeding' separate from the criminal
prosecution. The government's characterization of the forfeiture in this case as 'administrative'
does not preclude this conclusion. The Court therefore finds that the forfeiture in this case
constituted a separate proceeding from the criminal conviction."); United States v. Aguilar,
886 F. Supp. 740, 743 (E.D. Wash. 1994) ("It is irrelevant whether, as the government claims,
Aguilar failed to contest the forfeiture . . . . This criminal proceeding constitutes a second
punishment for the conduct already punished by the civil forfeiture action, and is barred by
the double jeopardy clause.").
Unlike Torres, and to a greater extent than in Quinones-Ruiz and Aguilar, a motorist has
participated, albeit unwillingly, to an "on the spot" summary ALS process.
254. United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Ursery, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-
345, 95-346).
255. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.10 (1989).
256. In a single proceeding the multiple-punishment issue would be limited to ensuring
that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature. Halper, 490 U.S.
at 450; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-369 (1983) ("Where. . . a legislature specifically
authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes . . . the prosecutor may seek and the
trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.").
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Ohio courts that have analyzed whether the ALS/OMVI statutory
scheme constitutes separate proceedings, or, instead, dovetail into the same
proceeding, have examined recent double jeopardy cases for guidance.25
Ohio courts that have held that the ALS/OMVI statutes constitute a "single,
coordinated proceeding" look to the case of United States v. Millan for sup-
port.
In Millan, arrest warrants for members of the Bottones family, and sei-
zure warrants for their property, were issued on the same day by the same
magistrate for the same criminal conduct. Shortly thereafter, the Bottones
entered into a stipulation, in which they forfeited property and $234,804.48.
Prior to trial, they moved to dismiss their criminal charges on the basis of
double jeopardy. The trial court rejected their motions, holding, inter alia,
that the civil forfeiture and the criminal case constituted a single proceeding.
The Second Circuit affirmed. Noting that Halper did not preclude the
government from seeking the full range of civil and criminal penalties in the
same proceeding, 258 the court held that the civil and criminal actions "were but
different prongs of a single prosecution of the Bottones by the government."259
Although the civil and criminal cases were filed under different docket num-
bers, "courts must look past the procedural requirements and examine the
essence of the actions at hand by determining when, how, and why the civil
and criminal actions were initiated." Although cognizant of the Halper [and
$405,089.23] concern that the government might act abusively by seeking a
second punishment when it is dissatisfied with the punishment levied in the
first action, the Second Circuit noted that the actions were filed contempora-
neously and not consecutively, and thus provided the Bottones with notice at
the outset that the government intended to pursue all available civil and crimi-
nal remedies.
260
257. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346) (separate proceedings);
United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Ursery, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-
345, 95-346) (separate proceedings); United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d
1493 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Bottone v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) (single, coordinated prosecution).
Recently, the Fifth Circuit sided with the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits in holding that a civil
forfeiture case and a criminal proceeding are separate proceedings for double jeopardy
purposes. United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995).
258. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
368-69 (1983).
259. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20.
260. Id. See also One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d at 1499. In One Single Family
Residence, the court held the "simultaneous pursuit" of criminal and civil sanctions, both
encompassed in 18 U.S.C. § 1955, falls within the contours of a single, coordinated prosecution
and is merely seeking cumulative punishment for a single course of punishment.
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The cases that have held that Ohio's scheme constitutes "separate pro-
ceedings" ground their decisions, in part, on United States v. $405,089.23 and
United States v. Ursery. In $405,089.23, the government filed a forfeiture
case five days after a grand jury issued a superseding indictment for a variety
of drug, money laundering and conspiracy charges. The case was stayed,
pending the completion of the parallel criminal case being heard before a
different judge. After the claimants in the forfeiture action were convicted of
the criminal charges, the government filed for summary judgment in the for-
feiture case, relying on the convictions in the criminal case to establish prob-
able cause for the forfeiture. Since the claimants did not produce any evidence
tending to show the property was not subject to forfeiture, the court granted
summary judgment to the government.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that the case implicates "core Double
Jeopardy protection. ' 26 The court explained:
We fail to see how two separate actions, one civil and one criminal, insti-
tuted at different times, tried at different times before different factfinders,
presided over by different district judges, and resolved by separate judge-
ments, constitute the "same proceeding." In ordinary legal parlance, such
actions are often characterized as "parallel proceedings," but not as the
"same proceeding." A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would
constitute the same proceeding only if they were brought in the same in-
dictment and tried at the same time .... However, the government chose
to proceed against the claimants on two separate fronts - in two separate,
parallel proceedings. Because the district court followed the customary
practice and held the civil action in abeyance pending the outcome of the
criminal prosecution, the government obtained a significant advantage: if
it succeeded in the criminal case it could obtain summary judgment based
on the conviction .... while if it lost it could still seek forfeiture and urge
that the more lenient standards applicable in civil proceedings be applied
.... We believe that such a coordinated, manipulative prosecution strat-
egy heightens, rather than diminishes, the concern that the government is
forcing an individual to "run the gauntlet" more than once.262
Both Millan and One Single Family Residence were decided before Kurth Ranch and have
been criticized as "clearly wrong." See SMITH, supra note 133, at 12.10. For example,
Judge Easterbrook noted, "[iln Kurth Ranch itself, the tax proceeding was begun at the same
time as the criminal prosecution; the Supreme Court did not think the fact that the two were
pending contemporaneously mattered. 114 S.Ct. at 1747 n.2 ." United States v. Torres, 28
F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
261. United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Ursery, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No.
95-345, 95-346).
262. Id. at 1216-17.
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The court further held:
We can discern no reason why two proceedings should be deemed one
when one of the proceedings involves a criminal prosecution and the other
a civil forfeiture action. We conclude, therefore, that whether or not two
actions are brought as part of a "single, coordinated prosecution" is irrel-
evant for purposes of the Double Jeopardy clause: a civil forfeiture action
which is brought and tried separately from a criminal prosecution and is
based upon the same offense constitutes a separate "proceeding." '263
In United States v. Ursery, the government instituted a civil forfeiture
action, which Ursery resolved by entering into a consent judgment and agree-
ing to pay the government $13,250.00. During the pendency of the civil suit,
the federal government indicted Ursery for drug trafficking, which was re-
solved by ajury's guilty verdict, approximately one month after the court had
accepted and filed the consent judgment in the forfeiture case. The Sixth
Circuit "acknowledg[ed]" the Ninth Circuit's position that parallel criminal
and civil forfeiture proceedings based on the same conduct will always vio-
late the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the Sixth Circuit believed that the
Ursery case would still be outside the scope of a "single, coordinated proceed-
ing," regardless of $405,089.23, because the attorneys who handled the civil
and criminal cases respectively had no communication with each other, the
actions were filed four months apart, were presided over by different judges
and were resolved by different judgments.264
Ultimately the United States Supreme Court must decide the limits of
pursuing parallel criminal and civil actions, as well as the significance of
"timing" in bringing the actions. 265 On the one hand, the government has
always been permitted to bifurcate a single indictment containing both crimi-
263. Id. at 1218.
264. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346) ("The district court judge
found these two proceedings to be part of a 'single, coordinated proceeding' without providing
any factual support for this determination. As a matter of principle, applying a label to
something does not make it so."). Accord United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995).
Perez was arrested with 96 kilograms of marijuana in her vehicle. After indictment, the
government brought an in rem civil proceeding seeking forfeiture of her vehicle. Perez entered
into a "Stipulation of Settlement" and agreed to the forfeiture of her $23,000.00 car.
Subsequently she moved to dismiss her indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Perez's
ongoing prosecution was held to be a second attempt to punish her criminally for the same
marijuana offenses as implicated in the civil forfeiture action and was barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 349.
265. However, after Kurth Ranch, the government "would do well to seek imprisonment,
fines and forfeitures in one proceeding" because "after Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, the
nomenclature 'civil' does not carry much weight." United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463,
1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
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nal and forfeiture counts, if the defendant consents to the bifurcation. 66 In
many cases, especially if contemporaneous with each other, a defendant will
be able to effectively negotiate the resolution of all proceedings and, rather
than be victimized by a "coordinated, manipulative prosecution strategy,"
actually obtain an advantage by being able to swap property for sentencing
concessions. 267 Conversely, the prospect of defending two different actions,
often in different courtrooms with different judges and juries, with different
burdens of proof and procedures, is just the type of mischief the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause was designed to prevent.
It is immediately clear that the Ohio ALS/OMVI statutory procedure is
neither a unitary proceeding where all charges are heard at the same trial, nor
separate, parallel proceedings of the nature condemned in $405,089.23 and
permitted in Millan. Instead, the ALS is somewhat of a hybrid, evolving over
decades on the basis of increasingly punitive amendments which narrowed the
timing of the actions in relation to each other, and which left to the courts the
formidable task of providing solutions to any unanswered questions in the
amendments .268
The cases holding that the ALS is a proceeding separate and apart from
the OMVI charge 269 all rely on Ohio Supreme Court precedent (State v.
Starnes and Hoban v. Rice) from the early 1970s holding the ALS to be civil
and administrative in nature.270 However, the system in effect at the time of
Starnes and Hoban resembles the present system in name only.271 At that
266. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977); United States v. Jenkins 904
F.2d 549, 557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990).
267. The author makes no comment on the ethics of this type of plea negotiation except to
acknowledge that it takes place and appears to be accepted in the practice.
268. For example, "[t]he statute does not specify whether the licensee must file a written
notice of appeal and request a hearing in order to perfect an ALS appeal." State v. Hochhausler,
Nos. CA93-12-104, CA93-12-105, 1995 WL 308484, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist., May
12, 1995). See also State v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.,
6th Dist., Aug. 18, 1995) (in rejecting Knisely's void for vagueness claim, the court noted
that "[m]erely because a statute doesn't patently describe the type of rules to be applied to a
hearing, such a purported deficiency is not of such a magnitude as to overcome the presumption
of unconstitutionality.").
269. State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 49329t, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist.,
Aug. 21), appeal granted, 656 N.E.2d 346 (Ohio 1995); State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA-232,
1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June 27), appeal granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio
1995); State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL 275770, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App., 3rd Dist., May
12), appeal granted, 655 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995); State v. Harrison, 654 N.E.2d 210, 211
(Ohio C.P. 1995); State v. Toriello, 654 N.E.2d 1015, 1077 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); State v.
Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Miller, 646
N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209, 1211
(Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995).
270. See Hoban v. Rice, 267 N.E.2d 311 (1971); State v. Starnes, 254 N.E.2d 675 (1970).
271. See supra section Ill(E) (describing the 1970 system).
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time, a refusal to take a requested chemical test resulted in notification by the
Registrar that a motorist's license would be suspended, unless the motorist
filed a petition contesting the suspension. The filing of the petition, heard
under a different case number and by a different judge than the OMVI charge,
tolled any license suspension pending adjudication by the court and any ap-
peal that might be filed. Additionally, occupational driving privileges were
immediately available to the motorist. Therefore, the ALS and the OMVI
charge oftentimes did not run on even closely parallel tracks.
Today, the ALS, as recognized by at least four Ohio courts,2 7 2 is closely
tied to the OMVI charge. When a motorist tests over the "per se" limit, the
ALS is triggered by the precise conduct that is subject to the criminal charge.
Both the complaint and the ALS suspension are given to the motorist at the
time of arrest. The ALS can be reviewed at the initial appearance on the
substantive OMVI charge. Oftentimes, the cases are docketed together.
273
When consideration of the ALS is continued by either the parties or the judge,
the ALS is assigned to the same judge, (and often the same prosecutor), as
assigned to the OMVI. 74 A court is statutorily without power to stay the effect
of the ALS, or to grant occupational driving privileges, during the initial
stages of the suspension. Even though the statute provides that the ALS is
"independent" of any penalties for the OMVI charge, the ALS is inextricably
connected to the outcome of the OMVI charge since it terminates upon a
guilty or no contest plea, or upon acquittal by the court. 275 Moreover, the
duration of any ALS is credited against any suspension given by the court.276
272. State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d
195 (1995); State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th
Dist., Oct. 5, 1995); City of Whitehall v. Weese, No. 95 APC02-169, 1995 WL 614139 (Ohio
Ct. App., 10th Dist., Oct. 17, 1995).
273. Weese, 1995 WL 614139 at *7 (Close, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(the ALS and the criminal proceedings were docketed together and labeled under the same
case number and heard by the same judge).
274. In Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350, at *4, the ALS proceeding has been characterized as
more closely resembling the resolution of a pretrial motion proceeding rather than a separate
administrative proceeding.
275. An ALS suspension triggered by a refusal is terminated if the motorist pleads guilty
or no contest to the charge of OMVI. Otherwise it continues until expiration.
276. As stated in Uncapher:
[T]he ALS merges with the DUI/PAC case in the municipal court, where the traffic
judge, within the traffic case, determines the ALS appeal, occupational rights,
termination of the suspension, continuation of the suspension, and crediting of the
ALS to the court suspension. For all purposes, there is one case, one court, one
judge and one suspension. Therefore, double jeopardy does not apply because the
ALS does not involve multiple proceedings as previously characteiized by court
analysis.
650 N.E.2d at 205.
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It is also clear that, but for the mandated "on the spot" license suspen-
sion, the present ALS does not lend itself to a "manipulative prosecution strat-
egy" producing "significant advantage[s]" to the prosecution of the type
condemned in $405,089.23. Rather than "whitewashing [a] double jeopardy
violation ... by affording constitutional significance to the label of 'single,
coordinated prosecution," '277 for many defendants, a holding that the ALS is
part of the same proceeding as the OMVI charge may result in significant
advantages for them. For example, if the ALS were a separate civil proceed-
ing, counsel would not have to be provided at state expense. A holding that
the ALS is in the form of a "pretrial motion,"'278 would appear to mandate
appointment of counsel who would be obliged to contest the ALS in many
cases. Moreover, contested ALS hearings would yield defendants valuable
discovery for the trial on the substantive charges, and could provide leverage
for resolving the case on a favorable basis. The downside for the judiciary
may be more hearings, using up scarce courtroom space, time and resources.
There is no easy answer to the issue of "separate proceedings." '279 Other
nuances of the present scheme militate in both directions. For example, the
method of adjudication of the ALS is significantly different than an OMVI
violation. 20 The ALS is exacted without a finding of guilt beyond a reason-
277. United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1217 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995 (NO. 95-346).
278. See State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th
Dist., Oct. 5, 1995).
279. One authority has recommended that the ALS proceeding be considered "civil in nature"
that is "ancillary to the criminal matter." PAINTER AND LOOKER, supra note 16, at 7.6.
At this time, Ohio courts are not in agreement concerning the treatment of the ALS as a
separate proceeding. Painter and Looker have described the confusion as follows:
Some courts seem to have taken the position that the appeal of the ALS is a separate
civil matter, and should be filed as a separate civil complaint, as was the case with
the previous "implied consent" suspensions. Under the former "implied consent"
law, an appeal of the suspension for the refusal to take the test ... was filed in the
municipal or county court which had jurisdiction over the place where the defendant
resided, not the place where the event occurred ....
In light of the language that the appeal of the ALS may be "filed" at the initial
appearance, which is obviously part of the criminal case, it is only common sense
that the ALS appeal should be part of the criminal case. Otherwise, an extremely
anomalous situation would occur, especially in a multi-judge court: one judge might
hear the D.U.I. case and another hear the ALS suspension, and even a third judge
could hear the petition for occupational privileges. Under the Rules of
Superintendence, a civil case would be assigned to a judge selected by lot.
For all the above reasons , it is strongly recommended that the ALS appeal, and the
petition for occupational privileges, be treated as civil matters, ancillary to the
criminal case, have the same case number, and be assigned to the same judge.
Id.
280. An ALS hearing certainly meets the statutory definition of a "trial," which is defined
Winter 19961
55
Kravitz: Ohio's Administrative License Suspension
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON LAW REVIEW
able doubt, and unlike many typical criminal motions, the defendant must
shoulder the burden of proof. Also, ALS proceedings are subject to the Rules
of Civil Procedure rather than the Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 11 and are not
strictly governed by the Ohio Rules of Evidence, as is characteristic of an
administrative proceeding where the rules of evidence are frequently re-
laxed.282 In fact, courts have permitted law enforcement officers' reports to
be admissible under Evidence Rule 803(8), as an exception to the hearsay rule,
because the ALS is a civil rather than criminal proceeding. 283 The means of
satisfying a judgment also differs in that the reinstatement fee for the ALS is
paid to the Registrar, while the reinstatement fee after on OMVI suspension
is paid to the court. 284 Finally, an appeal of the ALS to the municipal court is
decided separately from the criminal charges.
285
On the other hand, the interaction between the ALS and OMVI adjudi-
cations suggests some degree of interconnection. While the ALS is "indepen-
dent" of penalties and sanctions imposed pursuant to any other section of the
Revised Code, 286 the ALS is merged and credit is given at the time of sentenc-
ing for any ALS suspension, or it is terminated in the event of an acquittal.
287
as "a judicial examination of the issues, whether of law or of fact, in an action or proceeding,"
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Baldwin 1994), but that is of little assistance as this
definition can just as easily apply to a pretrial motion.
281. Lysaght v. Dollison, 399 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 1978).
282. See Simon v. Lake Geauga Printing Co., 430 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ohio 1982); Haley v.
Ohio St. Dental Board, 453 N.E.2d 1262, 1268 (Ohio Ct. App.1982); State v. Knisely, No. H-
94-044, 1995 WL 490937, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Aug. 18, 1995). The rules of
evidence are also relaxed for many pretrial motions in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 (1974) (hearsay permitted at hearing on motion to suppress
search).
283. See State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d
Dist., Sept. 29, 1995). OHIO R. EvID. 803(8) provides:
Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (a) the activities of the office or
agency, or (b) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, unless offered by defendant,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness. (Emphasis added).
284. See Elfrink, 1995 WL 584350, at *9 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
285. The outcome of an ALS hearing may affect the admissibility of prosecution evidence
at trial. For example, a determination that no reasonable grounds existed for an arrest on a
charge of OMVI, which the defendant must prove at an ALS hearing by a preponderance of
the evidence, should be accorded collateral estoppel effect at a subsequent, similarly grounded
motion to suppress. However, at least one court has rejected the use of collateral estoppel by
the defendant in this fashion. See State v. Roberts, No. 93 CA 2020, 1995 WL 271729 (Ohio
Ct. App., 4th Dist., May 4, 1995).
286. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(d)(1)(A) (Baldwin 1994).
287. Except for a refusal suspension where no plea is entered.
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The Third and Twelfth Appellate Districts have determined that the appeal of
an ALS before a municipal court judge is a "final, appealable order" which
must be appealed within 30 days of the municipal court decision.2 88 Notwith-
standing that, the ALS is merged into any sentence at the conclusion of the
case, thereby rendering many, if not most, appeals moot.
Ultimately the Ohio Supreme Court will have to determine whether the
current ALS departs so far from its predecessors that former ALS precedent
can no longer be considered controlling. In a 25 year unbroken string of
decisions from Ohio courts, an ALS suspension has been considered civil and
administrative in nature. It is unlikely the court will acknowledge that the
ALS is a component of the criminal case, because such a holding would
mandate counsel be provided to indigents to contest the ALS.289 However, the
state cannot declare the ALS a civil proceeding in order to avoid the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel and, in order to take advantage of relaxed
rules and procedures, concurrently hold that the ALS does not constitute a
separate proceeding in order to deny double jeopardy protection. Until the
Ohio Supreme Court is willing to change the nature of the proceeding to en-
sure that the rights ordinarily afforded criminal defendants are afforded to
ALS appellants, the hearing should continue to be characterized as "civil,"
and the hearing represents a "separate proceeding" for the purpose of deter-
mining double jeopardy protection.
C. The ALS and OMVI Punish the Same Conduct
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects the accused from multiple punish-
ments, in multiple proceedings, for the same offense. "[W]here the two of-
fenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the "same-
288. Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 647 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994);
contra State v. Mounts, 644 N.E.2d 1129, 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
289. There are no reported cases in Ohio where a court has appointed counsel solely to
appeal an ALS, presumably because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to
a non-criminal proceeding.
In State v. Hochhausler, Nos. CA93-12-104, CA93-12-105, 1995 WL 308484, at *9 (Ohio
Ct. App., 12th Dist., May 22, 1995), the Twelfth Appellate District held that a defendant
could orally notify the court of his intention to appeal the ALS at the initial appearance,
rather than filing a notice of appeal under a separate caption and case number. The court, in
reaching its decision, was "mindful of the fact that many defendants charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol are not represented by counsel at their initial appearance and
are thus unprepared to preserve their right of appeal by filing a written notice of appeal." Id.
If the ALS constituted part of the criminal case, counsel would be mandated at the initial
appearance to pursue the ALS. According to Hochhausler, if the trial court proceeds to the
merits of the ALS at the initial appearance, as contemplated by R.C. § 4511.191, many
defendants will be appearing pro se for the ALS appeal.
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elements" test [of Blockburger v. United States2 9°], the double jeopardy bar
applies."2 9 '
In Blockburger, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether
consecutive sentences could be imposed for two convictions under different
sections of the Harrison Narcotics Act. Blockburger was convicted, based on
one sale, of both selling drugs not in their original stamped package, as well
as selling drugs "not in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom the
drug is sold." The two counts netted Blockburger two five year sentences, the
terms of imprisonment to run consecutively.29 2 The Court, in formulating a
device for determining congressional intent regarding cumulative sen-
tences, 293 held:
[U]pon the face of the statute, two distinct offenses are created. Here there
was but one sale, and the question is whether, both sections being violated
by the same act, the accused committed two offenses or only one.
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a vio-
lation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to deter-
mine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provi-
sion requires proof of a fact which the other does not .... A single act may
be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an
additionalfact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punish-
ment under the other .... Applying the test, we must conclude that here,
although both sections were violated by the one sale, two offenses were
committed.
294
290. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
291. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993). See also Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977).
292. Id. at 303-4.
293. See LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 779 (2d ed. 1992).
294. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added). See also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S.
410 (1980). In Vitale, Vitale allegedly caused a fatal accident. A police officer at the scene
issued Vitale a ticket for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. Vitale was convicted
and sentenced to pay a $15 fine. The day after his conviction, the State charged Vitale with
two counts of involuntary manslaughter, based upon reckless driving. Vitale argued that the
subsequent prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 414.
The Court held that the second prosecution was not barred under the traditional Blockburger
test because each offense "require[d] proof of a fact which the other [did] not." Id. at 416.
Although involuntary manslaughter required proof of a death, failure to reduce speed did not.
Likewise, failure to slow was not a statutory element of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, the
subsequent prosecution survived the Blockburger test.
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The Court applied the Blockburger test to multiple prosecutions in
Brown v. Ohio.29 5 Brown stole a car on November 29, and was apprehended
in another county on December 8. He was originally charged with joyriding
on December 8, to which he pled guilty. Shortly thereafter, he was indicted
for auto theft and joyriding stemming from his conduct on November 29. His
convictions for the new offenses were affirmed by the state courts, despite his
double jeopardy objection.
The Supreme Court reversed. After concluding that an offense could be
the same without being "identical" for double jeopardy purposes, the Court
adopted the Blockburger test for determining when two offenses constitute the
same offense: whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not. The Brown Court then held:
If two offenses are the same under this test for purposes of barring con-
secutive sentences at a single trial, they necessarily will be the same for
purposes of barring successive prosecutions .... Where the judge is
forbidden to impose cumulative punishment for two crimes at the end of
a single proceeding, the prosecutor is forbidden to strive for the same
result in successive prosecutions.296
The Court then proceeded to apply the test to the facts of the case. Look-
ing to the definitions of joyriding and auto theft under Ohio law, the Court
determined that joyriding consists of taking or operating a vehicle without the
owner's consent, and auto theft consists of joyriding plus the intent to perma-
nently deprive the owner of possession. That is, the relationship of the two
offenses -joyriding being a lesser included offense of auto theft - was that
of concentric circles rather than overlapping circles. Thus, they were the
"same" under Blockburger since, as a matter of Ohio law, only a single, con-
tinuing offense was involved.29 7
United States v. Dixon2 98 is the most recent United States Supreme Court
opinion interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause as it relates to multiple
punishments in multiple prosecutions. 299 The Court reaffirmed Blockburger
295. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
296. Id. at 166; LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 294, at 779.
297. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 294, at 780. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682
(1977) (per curiam) (felony murder conviction barred subsequent trial for underlying felony).
298. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
299. Dixon overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which had expanded on
Blockburger by providing that even if two offenses did not meet the "same elements" test of
Blockburger, double jeopardy principles would still bar a subsequent prosecution by applying
a "same conduct" test, i.e., "if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted." See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856. By the Dixon Court
rejecting a "same conduct" check on the legislature, currently the only test to determine
Winter 1996]
59
Kravitz: Ohio's Administrative License Suspension
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON LAW REVIEW
as the sole test to determine whether a second prosecution is barred on double
jeopardy grounds due to the imposition of punishment in a prior case.
Dixon was arrested for murder and released on bail. His Conditions of
Release Form provided that he was not to commit "any criminal offense," and
violation of a condition of release might subject him to criminal contempt.
While Dixon was awaiting trial, he was arrested and indicted for possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute. The trial court issued a show cause order,
a hearing ensued and Dixon was held in contempt and sentenced to 180 days
in jail. He later moved to dismiss the cocaine indictment on double jeopardy
grounds, which the trial court granted and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court held that the contempt statute, as applied in Dixon's case,
incorporated as elements the entire governing criminal code, including the
offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Applying
Blockburger, the criminal contempt charge contained numerous elements
which were not contained in the cocaine distribution offense. Without more,
a prosecution on the cocaine distribution charge would not be barred. How-
ever, the cocaine distribution charge did not contain any element not con-
tained in the criminal contempt charge. "Because Dixon's drug offenses did
not include any element not contained in his previous contempt offense, his
subsequent prosecution violate[d] the Double Jeopardy Clause. ' 300 Stated
another way, "the relationship of the two offenses was that of concentric
circles rather than overlapping circles," and was therefore the 'same' under
Blockburger.
30 1
whether multiple punishments are barred in separate proceedings is the Blockburger "same
elements" test.
300. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam).
In Harris v. Oklahoma, a subsequent prosecution for robbery with a firearm was barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant had already been tried for felony-murder
based on the same underlying conduct. Id. at 682.
301. By way of contrast, in the companion case in Dixon, Foster was subject to a civil
protection order ("CPO") providing that he not molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or
physically abuse his wife, which he violated by throwing her "down basement stairs, kicking
her body, . . . [and] push[ing] her head into the floor causing head injuries . . .[and] lost
consciousness." Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2854. He was subsequently charged with criminal
contempt, which was prosecuted by his wife's private attorney. The criminal contempt charge
required the prosecution to prove as elements that there was a CPO, that Foster was aware of
it, and that an assault occurred. Foster was found guilty and sentenced to jail. Id.
Subsequently Foster was indicted for assault with intent to kill and moved to dismiss on the
basis of double jeopardy, which was denied by the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Highlighting the reciprocal nature of the inquiry under Blockburger, the Court stated:
On the basis of the same episode, Foster was . . . indicted for ... assault with intent
to kill. Under governing law, that offense requires proof of specific intent to kill;
simple assault does not. Similarly, the contempt offense required proof of knowledge
of the CPO, which assault with intent to kill does not. Applying the Blockburger
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According to the Blockburger-Dixon test, "if each statute requires proof
of an additional fact that the other does not," the defendant will not be pro-
tected from punishment in two separate proceedings. Therefore, in order to
determine if multiple punishments are barred, it is necessary to determine the
proof, or "elements," that comprise both the ALS and OMVI proceedings."'
Because the ALS can be triggered by both a "refusal" and a "failure," it
is necessary to examine both occurrences, and the elements of each indepen-
dently, in order to determine which, if any, substantive OMVI charges may be
barred. For example, when the ALS is the result of a refusal to take a chemi-
cal test, the only OMVI charge that the defendant can be charged with is driv-
ing "under the influence.""3 3 When the ALS is the result of a "failure," in order
to determine whether the double jeopardy bar applies, a comparison of the
ALS elements must be made with the elements of both the "under the influ-
ence" and the "per se"3 °4 divisions of the statute.
Ohio courts have given only cursory treatment to this issue. Many courts
determined that the ALS did not constitute punishment and never reached
consideration of the Blockburger-Dixon issue.30 5 All courts considering the
issue of whether an ALS "failure" is comprised of the same elements as the
"per se" offense conclude that the elements are identical.30 6 All courts con-
elements test, the result is clear: These crimes were different offenses and the
subsequent prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id. at 2858 (citations omitted). In other words, the relationship of the offenses was of
overlapping rather than concentric circles.
302. Many Ohio cases which have reached this issue have defined the issue as whether the
ALS and the OMVI constitute the "same offense," see State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376, 1381
(Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650 N.E.2d 195, 197 (1995), or involve the "same
conduct," see City of Whitehall v. Weese, No. 95 APC02-169, 1995 WL 614139, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App., 10th Dist., Oct. 17, 1995). State v. Sims, No. CA-94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist., Aug. 21), appeal granted, 656 N.E.2d 346 (Ohio 1995); State
v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA-232, 1995 WL 387619, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., June 27),
appeal granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995); State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 536 (Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1995). If these terms are meant to be synonymous with "same elements," then these
courts applied the correct legal terminology in determining the issue. However, the United
States Supreme Court, in Dixon, clearly rejected a "same conduct" test as a vehicle to determine
the propriety of when multiple punishments can be imposed in separate proceedings. Dixon,
113 S. Ct. at 2860.
303. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
304. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(2)-(4) (Baldwin 1994).
305. See State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL 275770, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist.,
Aug. 21, 1995); State v. Harrison, 654 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ohio C.P. 1995); City of Cleveland
v. Miller, 646 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Nutter, 646
N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995).
306. See State v. Elfrink, No. 95 APC03-364, 1995 WL 584350, at *7-9 (Ohio Ct. App.,
10th Dist., Oct. 5, 1995); State v. Sims, No. 94-CA-232, 1995 WL 387619, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App., 7th Dist., June 27), appeal granted, 652 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio 1995); Harrison, 654 N.E.2d
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sidering the issue of whether a "refusal" suspension bars a subsequent pros-
ecution for the "under the influence" charge conclude that a "refusal" ALS
does not present a bar to a subsequent prosecution for driving "under the in-
fluence."30 7 Only three courts have considered whether a "failure" ALS bars
a subsequent prosecution for an "under the influence" prosecution. Two
courts held that it does not; one court held that it does.3" 8
Assuming the ALS constitutes punishment,30 9 the courts holding that an
OMVI prosecution can proceed after an ALS suspension have improperly
applied the Blockburger-Dixon test. An ALS predicated on either a "refusal"
or a "failure" will serve as a bar to prosecution for any division of the OMVI
statute.
In every Ohio case, courts have simply examined whether the ALS con-
tains an element that is not included in the substantive OMVI charge. Using
this approach, a "refusal" suspension would not bar a prosecution on an "un-
der the influence" charge, because "under the influence" does not contain the
element of refusing to take a chemical test. Likewise, a "failure" would not
bar a prosecution on the "under the influence" charge, because a test over the
"per se" level is not an element of the "under the influence" charge.310
However, Blockburger-Dixon requires reciprocal inquiries: "whether
each offense contains an element not contained in the other. '311 Although an
at 213; State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d
1376, 1381 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995).
307. State v. Beltz, 654 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Uncapher, 650
N.E.2d 195, 203-04 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995); Sims, 1995 WL 493291, at *2; Baker, 650 N.E.2d
at 1382.
308. Sims, 1995 WL 493291, at *2 (bar only as to the "per se"); Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d at
537 (bar only as to the "per se").
In Harrison, 654 N.E.2d at 211, it is unclear whether the court, had it determined the ALS
was punishment, would have barred both the "under the influence" and "per se" charge.
One reason that appellate courts have not considered the issue of whether an ALS "failure"
presents a bar to both the "under the influence" and "per se" offense is that both offenses
should not be before the appellate court at the same time. Section 4511.19(C) provides that a
person may be charged with more than one section of the OMVI statute, "but he may not be
convicted of more than one violation of these divisions." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(c)
(Baldwin 1994). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25 (Baldwin 1994) (Multiple Counts).
Since one of the OMVI charges will ultimately be dismissed by the trial court prior to appeal,
it is beyond the scope of the appeal to determine if both the "under the influence" and the
"per se" OMVI offenses are barred by double jeopardy. Trial courts generally sentence on
the "per se" offense, perhaps because defense attorneys believe it carries less stigma than
"actually" driving under the influence of alcohol, and request sentencing accordingly.
309. See discussion, supra notes 177-250 and accompanying text.
310. See statutes, infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
311. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993).
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ALS may have elements not included in the substantive OMVI charge, it does
not necessarily follow that the reverse is true." 2 The ALS elements are set
forth in the statute describing the scope of the ALS appeal:
(a) Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable ground to believe
the arrested person was operating a vehicle upon a highway or public or
private property used by the public for vehicular travel or parking within
this state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol
and a drug of abuse or with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the
blood, breath, or urine, and whether the arrested person was in fact placed
under arrest;
(b) Whether the law enforcement officer requested the arrested person to
submit to the chemical test designated pursuant to division (A) of this
section;
(c) Whether the arresting officer informed the arrested person of the
consequences of refusing to be tested or of submitting to the test;
(d) Whichever of the following is applicable:
(i) Whether the arrested person refused to submit to the chemical test
required by the officer;
312. An example of the reciprocal inquiry formula is found in United States v. Ursery, 59
F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346). The court stated:
The government argues that the civil forfeiture and criminal conviction here do not
constitute punishment for the same offense because the criminal prosecution requires
proof that a person, the defendant, committed the crime, while the forfeiture requires
proof that the property subject to forfeiture has been involved in the commission of
a criminal violation. Thus each offense requires an element that the other does not.
We disagree with this analysis.
We find that the forfeiture and conviction are punishment for the same offense because
the forfeiture necessarily requires proof of the criminal offense. The forfeiture
applies to "[a]ll real property ... which is used ... to commit or to facilitate ... a
violation of this subchapter." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). Even though the standard of
proof is more easily met in the civil action, the fact remains that the government
cannot confiscate Ursery's residence without a showing that he was manufacturing
marijuana. The criminal offense is in essence subsumed by the forfeiture statute
and thus does not require an element of proof that is not required by the forfeiture
action.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accord United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee
Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 495 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 297-98 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 824
(E.D. Wash. 1994) ("[U]nless the civil forfeiture under § 881(a)(4) can be predicated upon
some offense other than those for which McCullogh has already been tried, the civil forfeiture
is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
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(ii) Whether the chemical test results indicate that his blood contained a
concentration of ten-hundredths of one per cent or more by weight of
alcohol, his breath contained a concentration of ten-hundredths of one
gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath,
or his urine contained a concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram
or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his urine at the
time of the alleged offense." 3
The OMVI section reads:
(A) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley
within this state, if any of the following apply:
(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alco-
hol and a drug of abuse;
(2) The person has a concentration of ten hundredths of one per cent or
more by weight of alcohol in his blood;
(3) The person has a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more
by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath;
(4) The person has a concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram or
more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of his urine. 14
When viewed from the perspective of whether every element of the
OMVI offenses are contained within the ALS, it is clear that they are. After
a simple comparison, it is immediately apparent that each element of all four
divisions of the OMVI statute are contained in the Ohio prerequisites for a
valid ALS suspension. Although a refusal is not an element of an "under the
influence" OMVI charge, the OMVI element of being "under the influence"
is a requirement of the ALS. Likewise, although a test over the "per se" limit
is not an element of an "under the influence" OMVI charge, the OMVI ele-
ment of being "under the influence" is a requirement of the ALS .315 Therefore,
313. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1)(a)-(d) (Baldwin 1994) (emphasis added).
314. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(l)-(4) (Baldwin 1994).
315. It is true that the person who appeals the suspension has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that one or more of the specified conditions in Ohio Revised
Code § 4511.191(H)(1)(a-d) have not been met. It is also true that a law enforcement officer
must only have "reasonable ground" to believe the arrested person was operating under the
influence of alcohol. However, in making double jeopardy determinations, "[t]he labels
affixed either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed . . . are not controlling and will not be
allowed to defeat the applicable protections of federal constitutional law." United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (quoting, Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988)).
In a civil forfeiture action, the government must show probable cause that the res was used
in the commission of various, designated offenses. Once shown, the burden shifts to the
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because the ALS and OMVI do not each contain different elements, utiliza-
tion of both the ALS and OMVI violates the Double Jeopardy Clause as
multiple punishments of the same offense in multiple proceedings.
D. Double Jeopardy Conclusions
The imposition of an ALS suspension was meant as a penalty for poten-
tially violating Ohio's OMVI laws. At the time the original versions of the
present scheme were enacted, there was no realistic double jeopardy check,
largely because the Supreme Court had been reluctant to extend double jeop-
ardy protection to "civil" proceedings. Since the "Halper genie" has been let
out of its bottle,31 6 however, legislatures must reassess penalty schemes that
inflict punishment in parallel criminal and "civil" proceedings for the same
conduct.
During the past twelve years, the General Assembly has increasingly
ratcheted up the punitive provisions of the ALS, and has correspondingly
eliminated an individualized assessment of a first-time arrestee's potential
threat to public safety from ALS consideration. 317 This trend, left unchecked,
will certainly continue in the future.
At some point, courts have a constitutional responsibility to acknowl-
edge that the label "remedial" does not operate as a talisman in order to avoid
difficult, politically unpalatable, decisions. 318 Ohio's present ALS constitutes
punishment. Ohio can continue to subject motorists to a variety of punitive
pretrial sanctions, but not without cost - critical judicial scrutiny which will
result in significant impediments to prosecuting the substantive OMVI of-
fense. The lesson of Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch is that when a jurisdic-
tion overreaches with civil punishment, it is limited to that punishment, and
a later opportunity to punish criminally will be barred.
claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence one or more defenses. See 21 U.S.C. §
881 (1994). "Even though the standard of proof is more easily met in the civil action, the fact
remains that the government cannot confiscate Ursery's residence without a showing that he
was manufacturing marijuana. The criminal offense is in essence subsumed by the forfeiture
statute and thus does not require an element of proof that is not required by the forfeiture
action." Ursery, 59 F.3d at 573.
316. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
317. See State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 605 (Minn. 1995) (implied consent is substantial
punishment "with remediation barely hanging on as an afterthought.").
318. Resolution of double jeopardy claims in favor of defendants can be a sensitive political
issue. "Many trial judges are reacting to it like Dracula to sunshine." Statement of John
Henry Hingson, Portland, Oregon, quoted in LAW. WKLY. USA, February 13, 1995.
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IV. THE ALS VIOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Introduction
During the upcoming term, the Ohio Supreme Court will review the
Sixth Appellate District's conclusion, in State v. Knisely, that Ohio's ALS is
violative of procedural due process." 9 Ohio's ALS is punitive, at least for
double jeopardy purposes. That conclusion, however, is only a factor in de-
termining whether Ohio's ALS violates due process guarantees.
At first glance, a punitive ALS would seem to undermine the argument
that the scheme comports with due process. Punishment is commonly thought
of as being meted out after conviction, and the converse has been criticized
long before Lewis Carroll wroteAlice in Wonderland.320 However, many civil
proceedings, such as forfeitures, inflict punishment without the nicety of a
criminal conviction and without the full panoply of rights that are required in
criminal prosecutions.121 At this juncture, constitutionally required proce-
319. State v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Aug. 18,
1995).
320. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to reach a verdict, the Queen of Hearts
exclaimed, "Sentence first-verdict afterwards." LEWIS CARROLL, Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland, in THE ILLUSTRATED LEWIS CARROLL 99 (Roy Gasson ed., 1978).
321. In Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court held that the loss of citizenship was
sufficiently punitive to trigger application of safeguards normally associated with criminal
trials. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). However, the Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed what rights normally attach to punitive civil proceedings.
ALS hearings have been held not to require the rights normally attendant to a criminal trial.
See People v. McKnight, 617 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Colo. 1980); People v. Gerke, 525 N.E.2d 68,
71-73 (Ill. 1988); Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D.
1989); Carney v. Motor Vehicles Division, 786 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (ALS
does not implicate criminal constitutional guarantees); State v. O'Brien, 609 A.2d 981, 982
(Ver. 1993) (no right to appointed counsel, jury, confrontation, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
In United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992), the defendants argued that civil
penalties in prior proceedings before the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
($75,000.00 fines) barred their subsequent prosecution on criminal offenses. Although the
district court ultimately held that the civil fines were remedial, the court was also concerned
with the constitutional rights that may be applicable to punitive civil proceedings:
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to impose upon administrative investigations
and other proceedings the rigorous requirements which the Constitution demands of
criminal prosecutions. Rules which up the constitutional ante in the administrative
setting may well render this line of authority obsolete. If the outcome of an
administrative charge against an individual can determine whether or not the
government has the right to indict that person, for example, it becomes difficult to
see why certain of the safeguards which attend criminal prosecutions should not be
imposed in the administrative context.
United States v. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. 536, 542 (N.D. I11. 1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.
1992) (citations omitted). See also Rudstein, supra note 75, at 600-16.
[Vol. 29:2
66
Akron Law Review, Vol. 29 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol29/iss2/3
OHIO'S ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION
dural safeguards for punitive civil proceedings are dependent primarily on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and many important ques-
tions, such as whether the right to counsel and confrontation apply in a par-
ticular setting, remain unanswered. 322 Thus, although Ohio's ALS constitutes
punishment prior to conviction, that conclusion does not mean, ipsofacto, that
the ALS violates due process. While the characterization of the ALS as
punitive is a consideration, employment of a broader calculus is necessary in
reaching an answer.
In State v. Knisely,32 3 the Sixth Appellate District held that Ohio's ALS,
exacted "on the spot," at the time of arrest, by the arresting officer, violates
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
322. In many respects, the present status of procedural protections in punitive civil
proceedings can be analogized to the protections afforded criminal defendants in state criminal
trials before 1960. Whatever protection existed depended on individual state constitutional
and statutory protection and the sometimes amorphous protections of the Due Process Clause.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 210 (1952) ("Due process of law, as a historic and
generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct
more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a
sense of justice'."); see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) ("Due process of law
... formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted
denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.").
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the Court adopted the
three-pronged test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to determine when due
process mandated the appointment of counsel in civil cases. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26. Most
courts employing this test in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings have refused to appoint
counsel. See, e.g., Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) (rejecting right to counsel in
all civil forfeiture cases). But see Torres v. $36,256.80, 25 F.3d 1154, 1161 (2d Cir. 1994)
(ordering appointment counsel because case involved sophisticated legal issues). See SMITH,
supra note 133, at $ 11.02, and cases cited therein.
Whether the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a punitive civil proceeding
depends on whether the action was triable to a jury at common law. For example, in civil
forfeiture proceedings arising from seizures on land, the courts of Exchequer provided for a
jury trial at common law. Therefore, in federal court, civil forfeitures cases are triable by
jury. See C.J. Hendry v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943). However, the Seventh Amendment
has never been made applicable to the States. Nonetheless, most state courts have interpreted
their state constitutional right to a jury trial, often couched in language identical to their
federal counterpart, as mandating a jury if the cause of action was triable to a jury at common
law. See Vergari v. Marcus, 300 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Commonwealth v.
One 1984 Z-28 Camaro Coupe, 610 A.2d 36 (Pa. 1992). See also SMITH, supra note 133, at
11.01, and cases cited therein.
Since automobiles weren't invented until approximately 100 years after the adoption of the
Seventh Amendment, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an ALS proceeding.
Digital & Analog Design Corp. v. North Supply Co., 590 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ohio 1992) (right
to jury trial under the Ohio Constitution applies to causes of action that were tried to juries at
common law).
323. State v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist., Aug. 18,
1995).
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Article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.3 24 The appellate court found
fault with two provisions of the ALS. The court was concerned that the arrest-
ing officer, "who is both accuser and arbiter of the offense," is not neutral and
impartial. Furthermore, the court believed that a summary "on-the-spot"
license suspension deprived a motorist of appropriate notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to the deprivation.3 25 In order to determine whether
Knisely should be affirmed, it is necessary to compare the Knisely court's
concerns to Supreme Court precedent.
B. The Constitutional Parameters of Procedural Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o
person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."3 26 Supreme Court "precedents establish the general rule that indi-
viduals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Govern-
ment deprives them of property."3 2 7 Further, the hearing must be meaning-
fu13 28 and "appropriate to the nature of the case."3 29 The nature and extent of
the process due depends on the resolution of the three-prong test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional safeguards; and
324. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit
governments from depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V, and amend. XIV, section 1. The procedural requirements of
the Fifth Amendment have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977).
325. Knisely, 1995 WL 490937, at *4.
326. The Ohio constitutional guarantees provide substantially the same safeguards as the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
327. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993) (due
process requires a pre-seizure hearing before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (potential loss of kitchen appliances and household
furniture was significant enough to warrant a predeprivation hearing). See also discussion of
right and privilege, supra Part II(B); State v. Mateo, 565 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ohio 1991) ("It is
... fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" (quoting, Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1982)).
328. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
329. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The concept
of due process is flexible and varies depending on the importance attached to the interest to
be protected and the circumstances under which the deprivation may occur. Walters v. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 435 U.S. 305 (1985). "Thus, procedures adequate to determine
a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540
(1971).
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finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirements would entail.3
Based on a balancing of the enumerated factors, a court can determine whether
the existing procedures are constitutionally sufficient.
The Constitution does permit some exceptions to the traditional rule
requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing, but only in "'extraordinary situ-
ations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies post-
poning the hearing until after the event .... Whether the seizure ... justifies
such an exception requires an examination of the competing interests at stake,
along with the promptness and adequacy of later proceedings." '3 31 In the con-
text of ex parte seizures of property, the analysis turns on whether the nature
of the property creates a "special need for prompt action" that otherwise an
owner could frustrate by notice and a hearing prior to seizure. 332 "To estab-
lish exigent circumstances, the Government must show that less restrictive
measures ... would not suffice to protect the Government's interests ....
[Without a] showing of exigent circumstances, . . . the ex parte seizure" vio-
lates due process. 3 3 The Supreme Court has examined these due process
requirements, in the context of license suspensions, in three cases: Bell v.
Burson, Dixon v. Love, and Mackey v. Montrym.
334
In Bell v. Burson, the Court held that a driver's license is a protectible
property interest, which cannot be suspended or revoked without procedural
due process, notwithstanding whether the license is denominated a "right" or
a "privilege. ' 335 The Court held that Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Respon-
sibility Act violated due process because it mandated a suspension of a
motorist's license after an accident, unless the motorist posted security to
cover the amount of any claimed damages stemming from an accident. The
hearing conducted prior to suspension excluded consideration of the
motorist's fault or liability for the accident.336 The Supreme Court held that
330. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
331. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
332. Id. at 501. "The purpose of [prior notice and a hearing] is not only to ensure abstract
fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession
of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken
deprivations of property .... " Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-81. See also Connecticut v. Doehr,
111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991) (state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of real estate without
prior notice or hearing was unconstitutional in the absence of extraordinary circumstances).
333. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 505.
334. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S.1 1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
335. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539. See discussion supra Part Il1(B) (right or privilege).
336. In Bell v. Burson, Bell was a clergyman who was subject to the Georgia Motor Vehicle
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procedural due process required a pre-suspension hearing on whether there
was a reasonable possibility of judgments being rendered against the licensee
in the amounts claimed.
3 3 7
Public safety was not a concern of the statutory scheme in Bell. How-
ever, the Court, in Dixon v. Love, addressed the issue of the procedural due
process requirements for license suspensions designed to protect public
safety. Love had been convicted of a number of traffic offenses which re-
quired the Secretary of State to suspend his license for being "repeatedly
convicted of [traffic] offenses to a degree which indicates disrespect for the
traffic laws."338 The statutory scheme did not provide for a pre-deprivation
hearing, although, if a motorist requested a hearing, the hearing had to be
scheduled "as early as practical." '339 Pending a hearing, a restricted permit
could be issued to a motorist, for either commercial use, or to alleviate a
hardship caused by the suspension.
3 40
The Court applied the three-pronged Mathews balancing test341 in deter-
mining that the Illinois scheme comported with procedural due process. The
Court recognized that a license suspension was a substantial penalty, but the
Illinois scheme was tempered by the special provisions for hardship and oc-
cupational driving privileges. The risk of an erroneous deprivation in the
absence of a prior hearing was considered "not great," because the suspension
was operative on the basis of prior convictions, and clerical errors in a
Safety Responsibility Act when a child rode her bike into his car. The child's parents filed a
report of the accident and claimed $5,000 in damages. After notification that he must post
sufficient security for any claimed damages, Bell requested a hearing, asserting that he was
not liable as the accident was unavoidable and stating that a suspension would severely
handicap the performance of his ministerial duties. His license was ordered suspended by the
Director of Public Safety because lack of liability was not a factor that could be considered in
the decision to suspend a license under the statutory scheme. Bell, 402 U.S. at 537-38.
337. Id. at 540-541 ("Since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the
State's determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently
with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.").
338. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110 (1977). The Secretary of State, pursuant to his
rulemaking authority, had adopted administrative regulations that defined the bases and
procedures for suspension which included assigning "points" for various kinds of traffic
offenses. The accumulation of a sufficient amount of points by a motorist triggered a suspension
or license revocation. Id. at 106.
Regarding commercial licenses, the statutory provision provided that a suspension shall
not deny "a person's license to drive a commercial vehicle . . . unless 5 offenses were
committed, at least 2 of which occurred while operating a commercial vehicle in connection
with his regular occupation." Any driver whose license is suspended, in order to "relieve
undue hardship" may apply for a restricted permit to drive to his place of employment "or
within other proper limits." Id. at 110 n.7.
339. Id. at 109-10.
340. Id. at 110 & n.7.
341. See supra note 331.
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motorist's driving license could be corrected by letter to the Secretary.34 2
Finally, in upholding the Illinois law, the important public interest in the
prompt removal of individuals who represent a safety hazard was held to
sufficiently distinguish the case from Bell.
The Court decided once more that a pre-deprivation license procedure,
predicated on public safety, was permissible.3 43 In Mackey, the Registrar of
Motor Vehicles was required to issue a 90 day license suspension to any
motorist who refused to take a requested test to determine the presence of
alcohol. The suspension did not take place at the time of the refusal. Instead,
a written report by the officer was forwarded to the Registrar, and a subse-
quent notice of suspension was issued.344 No hardship or occupational privi-
leges were available prior to or contemporaneous with the suspension. How-
ever, the opportunity for a hearing to contest the suspension was considered
immediate (within one to ten days).345
The Court held that the timeliness of the available post-suspension re-
view sufficiently protected the motorist's substantial interest in his license.
The Court noted the 90 day suspension period was far less onerous than the
suspension periods mandated by the Illinois scheme in Dixon. The Court
believed the risk of an erroneous deprivation was "not so substantial" that the
Massachusetts scheme should be invalidated. To the contrary, the officer
requesting the chemical test was characterized as "a trained observer and
investigator" who is acting on first hand information, and who must have a
driver's refusal witnessed by two officers in order for the suspension to be
valid. Finally, as in Dixon, the function of the statutory scheme was desig-
nated as grounded in public safety - a purpose for which the Court has "tra-
ditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures
... 346 In promoting the ends of public safety, the "summary and automatic
character of the suspension was considered an appropriate deterrent to drunk
driving, as well as providing a strong inducement to take requested chemical
tests - an interest which would be substantially undermined by a pre-suspen-
sion hearing.347
342. Love did not challenge the validity of his prior convictions. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105, 113 (1977).
343. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
344. In Montrym's case, the suspension was issued by the Registrar three weeks after his
arrest.
345. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 8 n.5.
346. Id. at 17.
347. The Court believed that the availability of presuspension review would lead to dilatory
tactics on the part of motorists and increase the financial burden of the state because of the
anticipated increase in hearings requested. Id. at 18.
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C. Ohio's ALS
The issue the Ohio Supreme Court must confront in Knisely is whether
Ohio's ALS is sufficiently similar to the suspension schemes already upheld
in Dixon and Mackey, or whether increasingly punitive amendments have not
only pushed the envelope, but have exceeded the boundary of due process.348
The Sixth Appellate District addressed two concerns of Ohio's present ALS
- the lack of impartiality on the part of the suspending agent (the arresting
officer), and the lack of notice and an opportunity for a pre-suspension hear-
ing. These concerns, standing alone, probably would not be sufficient to in-
validate Ohio's ALS. However, when combined with additional due process
concerns not specifically addressed in Knisely, the General Assembly has
gone beyond what the Constitution can tolerate.
The constitutionality of the ALS/OMVI scheme must be analyzed under
the Mathews test. The first prong of Mathews requires a consideration of the
nature and weight of the private interest affected by the challenged statute. In
determining this factor, all courts recognize that a motorist's interest in the
continued possession of a driver's license is substantial, because the state will
not be able to make a driver whole for any economic or personal hardship
suffered by any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension.34 9 The additional
relevant factors that must be considered are the duration of the license suspen-
sion, the availability of prompt post-suspension review and the availability of
hardship relief.
3 50
Ohio's ALS is particularly punitive. The suspension for first-time of-
fenders is a minimum of 90 days for "failures" and one year for "refusals".
The initial period without occupational driving privileges ranges from 15 days
for "failures" to 30 days for "refusals". Individuals with a prior record for
OMVI or for refusing to take a chemical test are subject to severe license
suspensions ranging up to five years,351 with no occupational driving privi-
leges permitted at any time.
3 52
The Knisely court was concerned that the summary nature of the ALS
afforded a motorist "no opportunity to be heard in any meaningful manner."
3
1
5 3
348. Compare Davis, supra note 7, at 721 (Ohio's ALS is violative of due process), with
Packard, supra note 18 (Ohio's ALS should be able to withstand procedural due process
challenges).
349. Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APC01-83, 1995 WL 527769, at *15 (Ohio
Ct. App., 10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995); State v. Hochhausler, Nos. CA93-12-104, CA93-12-105,
1995 WL 308484, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist., May 22, 1995).
350. Lovsey, 1995 WL 527769, at *15; Hochhausler, 1995 WL 308484, at *5.
351. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(E)(1)(d) (Baldwin 1994).
352. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(l)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
353. State v. Knisely, No. H-94-044, 1995 WL 490937, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist.,
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If the Knisely court meant that a summary suspension of a license violates due
process, then its conclusion is clearly undermined by both Dixon v. Love and
Mackey v. Montrym.354 In both cases, the Court upheld summary suspensions
in the face of due process challenges. However, if the Knisely court was
concerned with the unavailability of prompt, post-suspension review, then its
concern is justified.3 55
Once summary action has been taken, the motorist's stake in a prompt,
neutral review of that action increases significantly, and the state's interest in
deferring review decreases dramatically. Logically, the more punitive the
scheme, the greater the need for an immediate, meaningful post-deprivation
hearing.35 6 The Supreme Court tolerates summary license suspensions pro-
vided that sufficient safeguards are in place to provide immediate, meaning-
ful post-deprivation review, 35 7 or, at a minimum, procedures be available to
minimize the economic and personal impact on a motorist until a hearing can
be conducted.35 s
Rather than providing for an immediate hearing, 35 9 Ohio permits a hear-
ing to be continued indefinitely at the request of the defendant, the prosecu-
tor or the court.3 6° If a continuance is granted, the statutory scheme does not
permit an exception to the provisions prohibiting occupational driving privi-
Aug. 18, 1995).
354. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979). See also Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S.
1112, 1118 (1983) (per curiam) (Illinois scheme which provided driver with the right to
presuspension hearing for failing to submit to a breath test "accords him all, and probably
more, of the process that the Federal Constitution assures.") (emphasis added).
355. See also State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App., 2d Dist., Sept. 29, 1995) (Ohio's ALS is lacking in due process because it subjects
motorists to attenuated deprivations of property without a reasonable opportunity for relief.).
356. Cf City of Riverside v. McClaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975).
357. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) ("same day"). See also In re Revocation
of the Driver License of Fischer, 395 N.W.2d 598 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1986) (immediate appeal).
358. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110 n.7, 113 (1977) (occupational and hardship driving
privileges). See also Kernan v. Tanaka, 856 P.2d 1207, 1214 (Haw. 1993) (30 day temporary
permit granted with discretion to extend permit); State v. Schaefer, 609 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. Sup.
Ct. 1993) (ALS refusal hearing can be pre or post- suspension depending on time of motorist's
request); State v. Ankney, 704 P.2d 333 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1985) (license seized but stay granted
pending appeal); Hedden v. Dirkswagger, 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983)(7 day temporary
permit issued); Davis v. Commissioner, 517 N.W.2d 901, 904-5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(hardship privileges provided to alleviate due process concerns); Lavinghouse v. Miss.
Highway Safety Patrol, 620 So.2d 971 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1993) (30 day temporary permit which
can be renewed). See Davis, supra note 7, at 709-714.
359. In Mackey, the Court characterized the availability of a hearing after summary
suspension as between one to ten days. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 8 n.5.
360. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
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leges, or to the prohibition on granting a stay of the ALS pending a determi-
nation on the merits.
36'
In State v. Hochhausler, the court held that the length of the ALS suspen-
sion period was not unduly burdensome because the Supreme Court upheld a
summary suspension scheme in Dixon v. Love that provided for an indefinite
revocation of a driver's license.3 62 In both Hochhausler and Lovsey, the courts
determined that the availability of post-suspension review within five days of
arrest sufficiently protected the due process rights of motorists.3 63 However,
in Dixon v. Love, although the statutory scheme provided for an indefinite
revocation, occupational or hardship privileges were immediately available
to the motorist.3 64 Moreover, in Ohio, five day post-suspension review is
illusory. The Ohio scheme gives lip service to a prompt hearing but in actu-
ality permits courts and prosecutors unfettered discretion to delay ALS hear-
ings indefinitely.
365
In Franklin County, it was the common practice at the initial appearance
to delay consideration of all ALS issues until the criminal case was assigned
to a judge - even when the BMV ALS form was facially defective. Occupa-
tional driving privileges were never granted at the initial appearance.
Oftentimes, a determination of the merits of the ALS, or even a determination
of the request for occupational driving privileges, would be delayed several
361. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(H)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
362. State v. Hochhausler, Nos. CA93-12-104, CA93-12-105, 1995 WL 308484, at *5 (Ohio
Ct. App., 12th Dist., May 22, 1995).
363. Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APCO-83, 1995 WL 527769, at *16 (Ohio
Ct. App., 10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995) ("any wrongful deprivation . . . is minimal prior to the
time of the hearing being held"); Hochhausler, 1995 WL 308484, at *5.
364. See Hochhausler, 1995 WL 308484, at *15 (Jones, P.J., dissenting) ("This statutory
scheme does not provide an aggrieved licensee with a means of obtaining immediate hardship
relief ... [and does not] substantially reduce the burden imposed upon Hochhausler by the
ALS.").
365. Id. at * 15 (Jones, P.J., dissenting) ("There is no guarantee that an aggrieved licensee
may obtain judicial review . . . within a reasonable time or even within the period of the
suspension.").
In Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APC01-83, 1995 WL 527769 (Ohio Ct. App.,
10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995), the court was unconcerned about the potential unavailability of a
hearing within five days. The court noted that a hearing "must be held on the ALS within
five days of the seizure," noting that "any wrongful deprivation of the driver's license is
minimal prior to the time of the hearing being held." Id. at *8. The court casually dismissed
Lovsey's concern that, as a practical matter, the ALS hearing is often continued indefinitely,
by noting "nonetheless the statute provides for a hearing within five days." Id. The Lovsey
court may have interpreted Lovsey's assignment of error as an attack on the facial validity of
the statute rather than as applied. More realistically, the court probably dismissed Lovsey's
due process concern for the unavailability of a prompt hearing because of its contemporaneous
holding that the provisions prohibiting a stay of the ALS at the initial appearance were invalid
as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See discussion concerning separation of
powers, infra Part V.
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months.3 66 This is also the practice in many of the larger counties in Ohio,
where arraignment courts are generally overcrowded and time does not exist
for an individualized determination of the validity of the ALS.
3 6 7
Both the Hochhausler and Lovsey courts substantially understate the in-
terest of the motorist according to the Mathews format. If occupational privi-
leges were immediately available, or if a hearing was immediately mandated,
then the scheme would comport with due process. But neither of these con-
cerns is present. Instead, the Ohio scheme imposes substantial disabilities on
the motorist without a prompt, post-suspension hearing and without any pro-
cedures to mitigate the lack of a prompt hearing. Although the public inter-
est served by an ALS is great, in both Dixon and Mackey, the Supreme Court
would not have upheld the ALS schemes if these safeguards were not present.
The Knisely court was also concerned with the second prong of the
Mathews test - the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation due to the impo-
sition of the ALS. Specifically, the Knisely court was concerned that the ar-
resting/suspending officer is not neutral and impartial. Both the Hochhausler
366. Interview with Judge Theresa Liston, Franklin County Municipal Court (January 2,
1996). After Lovsey, judges oftentimes stay the ALS until the case is assigned to the judge
hearing the criminal case.
367. See State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App., 2d Dist., Sept. 29, 1995). The court stated:
R.C. 4511.191 is lacking in due process because, in view of the very real potential
for continuances in busy municipal courts, coupled with the allied prohibition against
occupational privilege exceptions . . . , the absolute prohibition against stays of
execution of the suspension pending a resolution of an appeal is an intolerable burden
on the private interests of any driver who has been subject to an erroneous deprivation.
It subjects him or her to an attenuated deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property interest without a reasonable opportunity for relief. It also permits the
state to seek and obtain a continuance, without limitation, that may impair a driver's
capacity to bear the burden of proof imposed on him or her by the statute for reversal
of the suspension.
Id.
In Hamilton County, the ALS is routinely continued at the court's request. The ALS is not
heard at the initial appearance, however judges at the initial appearance routinely grant
occupational driving privileges which become effective as soon as the absolute period of
suspension is served. The actual ALS hearing may not be heard for 30 to 60 days. Interview
with James Looker, co-author of OHIO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW (January 2,
1996).
In the Berea Municipal Court, the ALS was held to trigger double jeopardy protection-at
least for ALS failures. As a result, police and prosecutors have not been filing the ALS in
order to ensure prosecution on the substantive criminal charges. Interview with Judge William
C. Todia, Berea Municipal Court (January 2, 1996).
The smaller counties seem to be better able to accommodate a prompt hearing on the ALS.
In Portsmouth Municipal Court, if a defendant requests an ALS hearing, it is heard within 2
to 4 days after the initial appearance. Interview with Judge Howard Harcha III (January 2,
1996).
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and Lovsey courts address this concern and dismiss it pursuant to Mackey v.
Montrym.
In Mackey, the Supreme Court addressed the role of the arresting officer
and determined that the officer's role did not create an unacceptable risk of
an erroneous deprivation. In Mackey, the arresting officer was required to for-
ward a report to the Registrar if a motorist refused a chemical test. The re-
fusal was characterized as an objective fact which is "readily ascertainable"
by the officer -" a trained observer and investigator ... well suited for the
role the statute accords him in the presuspension process."3 68 The Court
stressed that the "refusal" report had to be witnessed by two officers, and that
the officers were personally subject to civil liability for any unlawful arrest
or misrepresentation of the facts. 369 Noting that the risk of error would be a
"rare exception," the Court held that a pre-hearing suspension did not present
an unacceptable risk of an erroneous deprivation and, therefore, would not be
violative of due process.
Ohio's ALS violates current due process protection notwithstanding that
the Supreme Court has characterized the actions of the arresting officer as
presenting a minimal risk of erroneous deprivation. The role of the arresting
officer should be re-examined, especially in light of Ohio case law indicating
that the risk of erroneous deprivation may be substantially greater than that
present in the Illinois and Massachusetts statutory schemes. It is seriously
questioned whether a valid refusal constitutes an objective fact that an officer
can determine in a fair and neutral manner. The Supreme Court has held in
a long line of prior cases that officers are not neutral and impartial when dis-
charging their duties, but instead are engaged in the "competitive activity of
ferreting out crime."37 0
In Wadsworth, Ohio, most arraignments are continued in order to afford a defendant the
opportunity to retain counsel or meet with appointed counsel. When the ALS is appealed, a
hearing is set down within 30 days of the date of arrest. Interview with Judge James Kimbler
(January 2, 1996).
368. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1979). But see State v. Ankney, 704 P.2d
333, 338 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1985) (Shepard, J., concurring) (Mackey did not authorize peremptory
seizure by a field officer of a valuable property right).
369. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13-14. Mackey conceded the issue of whether probable cause
existed to place him under arrest.
370. Even magistrates and prosecutors have been held biased when their duties involve
conducting investigatorial functions. See Lo Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)
(magistrate not neutral if he participates in the execution of a warrant); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (chief investigator and prosecutor were not neutral and
detached).
See also State v. Hochhausler, Nos. CA93-12-104, CA93-12-105, 1995 WL 308484, at *17
(Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist., May 22, 1995) (Jones, P.J., dissenting) ("R.C. § 4511.195 places
the police officer in the unique position of both judge and jury. I am shocked and appalled
that the General Assembly would enact legislation requiring a police officer, who can hardly
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Further, the issues that comprise a valid "refusal" are complex and
oftentimes subjective. The motorist must be arrested with probable cause,
advised of the consequences of a refusal, the BMV form must be filled out
properly and witnessed, the driving must be on a public highway (as opposed
to private property), the motorist must manifest an unwillingness to take the
test, and an opportunity to speak with counsel must be afforded. Any devia-
tion from these prerequisites can invalidate the ALS.3 7 1 In the case of a "fail-
ure" ALS, there is support for the conclusion that a chemical test failure pre-
sents a greater risk of an erroneous deprivation than in a "refusal" situation.
372
It is impossible to ascertain without statistics the number of administra-
tive license suspensions that are improperly imposed. Suffice it to say that the
caselaw is replete with instances where the imposition of these suspensions
have been held invalid.3 73 Since ALS suspensions often expire before an ap-
peal can be taken, or are merged into the criminal penalties at the conclusion
of the case, it is nearly impossible to determine the number of suspensions that
have been improperly imposed prior to disposition of the criminal case.
However, Ohio courts have noted that the risk of an improperly imposed ALS
is considerably greater than the insubstantial risk found in Mackey. Ohio
courts have described the power to impose the ALS as "often abused," 374 and
the issues subject to "serious dispute."
375
As presently constituted, Ohio's ALS does not provide any of the safe-
guards relied upon by the Supreme Court to uphold ALS schemes. There is
no question that the state has a weighty interest in protecting public safety.
That interest, however, is not enough to justify Ohio's current scheme when
balanced against the substantial interest of the motorist, and the very real risk
of an erroneous deprivation. The Ohio Supreme Court should acknowledge
the obvious when considering the issue this term.
be considered a neutral and detached agent of the state, to summarily seize valuable personal
property with virtually no possibility of meaningful review.").
371. See PAINTER AND LOOKER, supra note 16, at § 7.19-7.27.
372. Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983).
373. See PAINTER AND LOOKER, supra note 16, at chs. 7 & 9 and cases cited therein.
374. State v. Beltz, 654 N.E.2d 199 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995). The court explained:
This court has seen the power to impose immediate license suspensions often abused.
R.C. 4511.191 provides for immediate license suspensions only if the drinking driver
"tests" over the legal limit or refuses to consent to a test. Many officers are routinely
imposing the A.L.S. immediately upon drawing blood or urine specimens even though
chemical analysis will not be done for weeks. The driver has neither refused nor
tested over the limit at this juncture.
Id. at 200-01 n.2.
375. Hochhausler, 1995 WL 308484, at *15 (Jones, P.J., dissenting) ("It has been my
experience that the reliability and the timeliness of the chemical testing procedures used in
drunken driving cases is often subject to serious dispute.").
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V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
When the Ohio Supreme Court decides Gustafson and Knisely, the court
will be faced with three choices. First the court can uphold the constitution-
ality of Ohio's current ALS/OMVI statutory scheme, despite compelling
arguments to the contrary. Second, the court can make the politically unpal-
atable but correct decision that the ALS, as presently enacted, infringes on the
double jeopardy and due process rights of motorists. The court also has a third
option-one which can transform the ALS into a truly remedial remedy, as
well as short-circuit future double jeopardy and due process claims. The court
can adopt the reasoning in Village of Groveport v. Lovsey376 and State v. Sand-
ers,377 and hold that the provision of the implied consent statute which forbids
courts from granting a stay of the ALS pending a hearing, or pending the
outcome of the OMVI charge, is unconstitutional as violative of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.
37
1
Revised Code § 451 1.191(H)(1) provides:
If the person appeals the suspension at his initial appearance, the appeal
does not stay the operation of the suspension... [N]o court has jurisdic-
tion to grant a stay of a suspension imposed under division (E) or (F) of
this section, and any order issued by any court that purports to grant a stay
of any suspension imposed under either of those divisions shall not be
given administrative effect.
37 9
The Lovsey court recognized that the General Assembly has no right to limit
the judicial branch of the government with respect to its properly hearing and
determining actions and proceedings within the court's jurisdiction. Inher-
ent within the court's jurisdiction is the right to grant or deny stays.380 Be-
376. Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APCO1-83, 1995 WL 527769 (Ohio Ct. App.,
10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995).
377. State v. Sanders, Nos. 95 CA 11, 95 CA 12, 1995 WL 634371 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d
Dist., Sept. 29, 1995).
378. Although the Ohio Constitution does not contain an express provision forbidding one
branch of the government from exercising powers essential to other branches, the constitution's
specific allocation of powers to each branch of the government reflects a purpose that the
powers and duties of each branch should be separate. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogers, 73
N.E. 461 (Ohio 1905). The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the doctrine
of separation of powers is implied in the Ohio Constitution. See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee, 76
N.E. 865 (Ohio 1905). See, William J. Pohlman, Comment, The Continued Viability of Ohio's
Procedure for Legislative Review of Agency Rules in the Post-Chadha Era, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
251, 271 & n.189, n.190. (1981).
For a history of the separation of powers doctrine in Ohio, see Fredrick Woodbridge, A
History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13 U. CINN. L. REV.
191 (1939).
379. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(h)(1) (Baldwin 1994).
380. Lovsey, 1995 WL 527769, at *7.
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cause R.C. § 4511.191 (H)(1) was held to deprive a court of its ability to stay
an ALS suspension, the General Assembly was held to have improperly inter-
fered with the exercise of the court's judicial functions. Therefore, the Lovsey
court struck down the prohibition. 38 The court in State v. Sanders reached the
same conclusion. Noting that the exercise of judicial powers is confined to
the courts, the court held that the power to stay the proceedings before it is
essential to the existence of a court, and necessary to the orderly and efficient
exercise of its jurisdiction. As in Lovsey, the absolute prohibition of judicial
stays was held to violate the separation of powers principle.
8 2
The ability to stay the ALS at the initial appearance effectively trans-
forms a patently punitive and unconstitutional ALS into a scheme which
comports with due process and is true to its stated purpose-remedial inter-
vention. Double jeopardy and due process arguments are seriously under-
mined when the decision to continue the ALS is based on an individualized
assessment of whether the motorist is a threat to public safety. Drivers with
a history of impaired or reckless driving, or who have displayed other indicia
of dangerousness, can be prohibited from driving until a court has the oppor-
tunity to hear their ALS appeal.383 As to those drivers that present a lesser risk
to public safety, a court can either stay the ALS or tailor conditions to any
occupational driving privileges granted. In those cases where driving privi-
leges are granted in some form, the ALS post-suspension hearing need not be
381. Sister states have struck down similar provisions as violative of the separation of
powers doctrine. See, e.g., Ardt v. Illinois Dep't of Prof. Reg., 607 N.E.2d 1226, 1232 (Ill.
Sup. Ct. 1993) (statute which prohibited the stay of administrative sanctions during pendency
of judicial proceeding violated separation of powers doctrine); Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.
62, 64 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1984) (legislation prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions staying
administrative orders revoking liquor licenses).
382. Sanders, 1995 WL 634371, at *9. See also Ardt, 607 N.E.2d at 1226 (legislation
forbidding stay of sanctions during pendency of judicial review held violative of separation
of powers doctrine); Smothers, 672 S.W.2d at 64 (legislation prohibiting stay of administrative
order revoking retail beer license held violative of separation of powers doctrine);
Commonwealth v. Yameen, 516 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1987) ("To allow a
defendant to appeal his conviction yet mandate that his punishment could not be stayed while
he did so would be to pay lip service to the statutory provisions that establish the right for a
licensee to appeal while eradicating any practical reason for taking the appeal."). Cf. State ex
rel. Silcott v. Spahr, 552 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio 1990) (statute prohibiting trial court from granting
bond pending appeal conflicts with appellate rules and violates Ohio Constitution); State v.
Greer, 530 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1988) (statute providing for 12 peremptory challenges in capital
cases is "of no force and effect" because it conflicts with criminal rules promulgated by the
Ohio Supreme Court); State v. Smith, 537 N.E.2d 198 (1989) (courts have the inherent power
to stay execution of a sentence pending an appeal or a motion for a new trial). See also
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) ("The power to stay is incidental to
the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.").
383. These drivers are still entitled to a prompt, post-suspension hearing of their ALS
appeals.
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immediate, because driving privileges will usually reduce the motorist's in-
terest in a prompt hearing. An unconditional stay would not mandate a hear-
ing at all in most cases. In the case of a "failure," the ALS will be either ter-
minated by an acquittal or will be merged with the penalties for the OMVI
offense. "Refusals," which result in a plea of no contest or not guilty to an
OMVI offense, would also obviate the need for a hearing, provided interim
driving privileges are available. Only "refusals" where the OMVI charge is
actually tried, or where the OMVI charge is reduced, will result in ALS hear-
ings before the municipal court.
The Ohio Supreme Court can implement the Lovsey and Sanders ratio-
nale in one of two ways. It can hold the ALS as presently enacted is uncon-
stitutional and invalidate the entire statute, or, the court can hold that the stay
prohibition is severable from the remainder of the implied consent statute.
3 84
As will be shown, the result is the same under either scenario.
The effect of finding that the provision concerning stays is not severable
from the remainder of the statute would be that R.C. § 4511.196385 would
become operative in every case.386 This truly remedial statute requires a court
to suspend a license pending the outcome of the OMVI charge if the person' s
continued driving will be a threat to public safety. Under this scenario, an
arresting officer would no longer have the authority to seize and suspend a
license, however, a court would be able to quickly determine whether to is-
sue a public safety suspension.
In Lovsey and Sanders, the courts found the prohibition against issuing
stays of the ALS severable from the remainder of the implied consent statute.
The deletion of the prohibition would result in a brief seizure and suspension
of a driver's license until a court could make an individualized assessment of
the particular circumstances. The seizure and temporary suspension by the
arresting officer would provide a sufficient wake-up call to the motorist con-
cerning the seriousness of the alleged conduct, but would also permit a court
to temper the unnecessarily punitive aspects of the scheme at the outset of the
criminal case.
384. Village of Groveport v. Lovsey, No. 95 APC01-83, 1995 WL 527769, at *8 (Ohio Ct.
App., 10th Dist., Sept. 5, 1995). Both Lovsey and Sanders held the provision in the implied
consent statute which prohibited the issuance of a stay of the ALS was severable from the
remainder of the statute.
385. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196 (Baldwin 1994).
386. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.196(B)(1) (Baldwin 1994) provides that if the ALS is
terminated, the judge may impose a new suspension based on the motorist's threat to public
safety.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ohio's current ALS/OMVI scheme exceeds the permissible limits of due
process and contravenes the double jeopardy protection of those subject to an
ALS suspension. This conclusion is not the result of some unanticipated
thunderbolt from the United States Supreme Court, but instead is the result of
the legislature's failure to reconcile increasingly punitive civil sanctions with
constitutional doctrines in effect at the time of the 1993 enactment. Despite
its highly-charged public support, drunk driving legislation is not immunized
from constitutional scrutiny. Although courts have struggled to uphold ques-
tionable ALS/OMVI provisions against constitutional challenges, there
comes a point when disregard for the rights of citizens will cause a statutory
scheme to collapse from its own unconstitutional weight.
An OMVI charge is a serious crime and the legislature has broad latitude
to fashion penalties that effectively deal with the problem. However, punish-
ment is traditionally exacted after a criminal conviction. The imposition of
punishment prior to conviction will ultimately impede, rather than assist, in
the prosecution of offenders and the state's goal of improving public safety.
The Ohio scheme can be salvaged, at least in terms of future cases, by permit-
ting a court to stay the ALS at the initial appearance. The Ohio Supreme Court
should adopt the rationale of Lovsey and Sanders, and hold that the stay pro-
hibition of the ALS violates the separation of powers doctrine inherent in the
Ohio Constitution.
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